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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of peyote by members of the Native American Church is
one of the most controversial manifestations of religious conduct in
this country. Peyote, a hallucinogenic drug derived from a cactus
plant, has been used by North American Indians in religious ceremo-
nies for over four hundred years.' The federal government considers
mescaline, the active ingredient in peyote, to be a dangerous narcotic
and a controlled substance.2 Thus, there is a conflict between secular
drug enforcement laws which prohibit the possession and use of pe-
yote, and the religious laws of North American Indians, which re-
quire peyote use in religious ceremonies.
This conflict recently reached the Supreme Court of the United
States in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith.3 Smith was employed as a treatment counselor in a
drug rehabilitation facility. As a condition of employment, Smith
was required to abstain from using drugs in order to preserve his
credibility as a role model. However, Smith was also an active mem-
ber of the Native American Church, which uses peyote in its reli-
gious ceremonies.4 As a result, Smith was fired by his employer and
subsequently denied unemployment compensation benefits.5 Smith
was never arrested, prosecuted, or convicted of violating any criminal
drug statute. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court believed that this
case presented an opportunity to evaluate whether the free exercise
clause requires states to exempt religiously inspired peyote use from
their criminal drug laws.6
After a six-year journey through the Oregon State Court of Ap-
peals and two hearings before the Oregon Supreme Court, the case
1. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720, 394 P.2d 813, 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73
(1964).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 812, Sched. I (c) (11) & (12) (1988).
3. 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990) [hereinafter Smith II].
4. Id. at 1597.
5. Id. at 1598.
6. Id. at 1599.
was ultimately resolved in favor of the Oregon employment division.
However, the significance of the Smith case reaches far beyond the
use of peyote in religious ceremonies. In denying Smith's claim, the
Court lowered the level of review applied to laws which have an im-
pact upon religious conduct. Prior to Smith, the Court applied a
strict scrutiny test to laws which affected the free exercise of reli-
gion. However, the Court's new rule applies only minimal scrutiny to
general welfare laws which burden religious freedom.
This Note examines Smith's six-year history, and provides an anal-
ysis and comparison of the two Supreme Court decisions in the case.
Part II explores the ways in which courts have interpreted the free
exercise clause, focusing on cases which deal with employment and
peyote issues.7 Part III explains Smith's factual background and fol-
lows its extensive procedural history leading up to the first hearing
before the Court [Smith 1].8 Part IV explains the Smith I Court's de-
cision to remand the case for a clarification of Oregon law before de-
ciding the first amendment issue,9 and analyzes the Oregon Supreme
Court's response to the remand.10 Part V examines the Court's most
recent Smith opinion [Smith 11] and explains the important interac-
tion between the opinions issued by the United States Supreme
Court and the Oregon Supreme Court." Part VI explores the impact
of the Smith decisions by re-examining prior free exercise cases and
predicting how courts and legislators are likely to deal with free ex-
ercise rights in the future.12
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. History of the Free Exercise Clause
The first amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof."13 While the establishment clause essentially prohibits
the government from affirmatively endorsing any religious institu-
tions,14 the free exercise clause restricts the government's ability to
negatively impact the religiously motivated beliefs and acts of indi-
viduals. 15 Together, these two clauses are intended to place the gov-
7. See infra notes 13-110 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 111-45 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 146-69 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 170-87 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 188-337 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 338-55 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. amend I. The free exercise clause was first held applicable to the
states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
14. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
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eminent in a neutral corner with regard to religious matters.16
Attempts to decipher the intentions of the Framers of the Consti-
tution in enacting the free exercise clause often yield inconclusive
and ambiguous conclusions.17 One reason for this result is that prior
to the adoption of the religion clauses, the delegates of the ratifying
states held widely diverging views regarding the appropriate relation-
ship between religion and government.' 8 Additionally, the Framers
could not have envisioned the diversity and complexity of today's
religious issues. In any event, the origins of the free exercise clause
are of questionable significance because "[no] Supreme Court opin-
ion-majority, concurring, or dissenting-has ever grounded its inter-
pretation of the free exercise clause in its historical meaning."19
Since the Court places relatively little emphasis on the original in-
tent of the Framers, the precedents established by the Court are of
primary significance in analyzing free exercise claims. Consequently,
one must look primarily at Supreme Court decisions for specific gui-
dance in this sensitive area.
16. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1971).
17. However, numerous commentators have examined the subject. For discussions
of colonial experiences influencing the religion clauses and the original intent of the
ratifying delegates, see Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitu-
tion, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839 (1986); Hoskins, The Original Separation of the
Church and State in America, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 221 (1984); Marshall, Unprecedential
Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925 (1986); Smith, Getting Off
on the Wrong Foot and Back On Again: a Reexamination of the History of the Fram-
ing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and A Critique of the Reynolds
and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984); McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410
(1990); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3 (2nd ed. 1988) (citing
commentaries).
18. Virginians such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison envisioned a com-
plete separation of church and state and were primarily responsible for the inclusion
of the religion clauses in the first amendment. Kurland, supra note 17, at 853-54, 859.
Representatives from states with close ties to a church ratified the religion clauses pri-
marily to prevent the federal government from interfering with their preferred reli-
gions. 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.2, at 342 (1986) [hereinafter TREATISE]. These states
were "no more tolerant of minority religious practices than the Mother country whose
persecution they' had escaped." Kurland, supra note 17, at 852. Another school of
thought favored imposing an affirmative burden on the state to encourage all religions
for the moral welfare of society. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELI-
GION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965).
19. McConnell, supra note 17, at 143. However, the Court frequently analyzes
the historical background of the first amendment in the context of establishment
clause issues. Id.
1. The Evolving Level of Review
The scope of the free exercise clause was first tested in 1879 in
Reynolds v. United States.20 In Reynolds, the defendant was charged
with polygamy, a crime in the Utah Territory and by act of Con-
gress.21 Reynolds argued that, as a member of the Mormon Church,
it was his duty to practice polygamy, and thus his conduct was pro-
tected by the free exercise clause.22 The Court noted that although
the free exercise clause provides absolute protection for religious be-
liefs, not all religiously motivated conduct is protected.23 In rejecting
Reynold's claim, the Court's level of review most closely resembled
minimal scrutiny, as evidenced by the statement that "it is within the
legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to determine
whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under
its dominion."24 The Court devoted a substantial portion of its analy-
sis to explaining why the government had an important interest in
promoting monogamous marriages. This suggests that the compelling
state interest test could have been satisfied if it had been applied.2 5
After Reynolds, in addition to consistently upholding polygamy
laws in the face of free exercise claims,26 the Court applied minimal
20. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
21. Id. at 161.
22. Id. at 161-62.
23. The absolute protection of religious beliefs was first recognized in Reynolds v.
United States when the court stated: "Laws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices." Id. at 166. This doctrine has been reaffirmed in almost every Supreme
Court free exercise case.
24. Id. (emphasis added). This language is indicative of minimal scrutiny because,
under a rational basis review, the Court's query is limited to determining whether the
law at issue is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. A legitimate state inter-
est is any broad social goal intended to promote the general welfare of the state. Legit-
imate state interests are those which "promote the health, peace, morals, education,
and good order of the people, and [which]... increase the industries of the State, de-
velop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity." Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27, 31 (1885). Under this level of review, the Court will uphold a law if it can find
any conceivable rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., L. TRIBE,
supra note 17, § 16-2, at 1439-43.
25. The Reynolds Court referred to marriage as a "most important feature of so-
cial life.... Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social
relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily re-
quired to deal." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added). This language suggests
that the state had a "compelling interest" in regulating marriage. The Court also sug-
gested that because of the ripple effect which polygamy has on the fabric of society, a
complete prohibition against polygamy would be the least restrictive means of accom-
plishing its compelling interest. Id. at 165-66. Thus, the compelling state interest test,
if applied, could have been satisfied.
26. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (Mormon crossing state line
with his wives violated federal law prohibiting interstate transportation of women for
"immoral purposes"); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1 (1890) (upholding confiscation of property and dissolution of church which
practiced polygamy); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (statute requiring persons
[Vol. 18: 163, 1990] Employment Division
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
scrutiny under a rational basis level of review to uphold a wide vari-
ety of laws which had an impact upon the free exercise of religion.
For instance, in Prince v. Massachusetts2 7 the Court considered the
claim of a Jehovah's Witness who maintained that a labor law which
prohibited her child from distributing religious solicitation materials
violated their free exercise rights.28 In denying the parent's claim,
the Court proclaimed that "[ilt is sufficient to show ... that the state
has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and author-
ity in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this includes, to
some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction."9 The
Prince Court's deference to legislative authority was a reflection of
the minimal scrutiny under which the free exercise claim was
analyzed.30
During the 1940s and 1950s, the Court applied heightened scrutiny
to laws which had an impact upon the free exercise of religion only if
the laws also implicated other first amendment concerns.3 1 For ex-
ample, in Cantwell v.Connecticut 32 the Court was faced with a stat-
ute which expressly regulated religious solicitations. In striking
down the statute, the Court attributed the claimant with both free
speech and free exercise. 33 And in West Virginia Board of Educa-
registering to vote to renounce membership with any religious order advocating polyg-
amy was constitutionally permissible). Some commentators attribute the Court's
tough stand against polygamy on the nation's anti-Mormon sentiment in the late nine-
teenth century. See L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 14-13, at 1271; P. KURLAND, RELIGION
AND THE LAW 114 n.25 (1962).
27. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28. Id. at 159.
29. Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
30. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), rev'd, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (deference to legislative determination that the pledge of allegiance achieved le-
gitimate secular goals).
31. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (highly discretionary permit re-
quirement as condition for conducting public gospel services struck down as a prior re-
straint of free speech); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (regulation banning
religious solicitation in company-owned town is contrary to first amendment guaran-
tees of free speech, press and religion); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 73
(1944) (ordinance taxing agents who sell books to religious solicitors invalid as a viola-
tion of first amendment guarantees); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
(same); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ordinance forbidding distribu-
tion of religious publications without permit struck down on free speech, press and
religion grounds); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (same). See also Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right of parents to enroll their children in private
religious schools in place of attendance at public schools upheld on both free exercise
and fundamental right grounds).
32. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33. Id. at 307.
tion v. Barnette,3 4 a Jehovah's Witness group objected to the school
forcing three children to pledge allegiance to the flag because the
pledge violated their belief in God's supremacy. Once again, the
Court struck down the rule based on both free speech and free exer-
cise grounds.35 Interestingly, the Barnette Court used language
which, for the first time, indicated that free exercise claims merited a
higher level of review. 36 However, prior to 1960, laws which had an
impact solely on free exercise rights received only minimal scrutiny.
Consequently, free exercise claimants 'who were unable to character-
ize their religious objections as hybrids involving multiple first
amendment violations were generally unsuccessful. 37
The first major step in elevating the level of review in free exercise
cases occurred in Braunfeld v. Brown.38 In Braunfeld, the state of
Pennsylvania enacted a law which required certain retail stores to be
closed on Sunday. 39 The purported neutral purpose of the law was to
provide a uniform day of rest.40 A group of Orthodox Jewish
34. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
35. Although the Court devoted substantial analysis to the impact of a compulsory
flag salute on religious beliefs, the Court's final holding was not based solely on free
exercise grounds. The Court stated that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id. at 642. Barnette is generally
regarded by legal commentators as both a free speech and free religion case. See, e.g.,
L. TRIBE, supra note 17, §§ 12-4, at 804, 14-3, at 1165 (discussing Barnette in both free
speech and free religion contexts respectively).
36. The court declared that "[the freedom of worship is] susceptible of restriction
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully
protect." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639.
37. "As of 1960, no case in the Supreme Court had resulted in the overturning of
police power regulations solely on the basis that they had coercive effect on the free
exercise of religion." TREATISE, supra note 18, § 21.7, at 399. See, e.g., Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parade licensing scheme that was neutrally enacted
and applied upheld despite free exercise challenge by a Jehovah's Witness group);
Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (compulsory military
classes in university upheld against claimant's religious and conscientious objections to
war).
38. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
39. Id. at 600.
40. Although the origin of a uniform day of rest on Sunday is rooted in Christian-
ity, the Court rejected the argument that the law conflicted with the establishment
clause by simply citing to a case decided on the same day as Braunfeld which ad-
dressed the same Sunday closing laws. Id. at 601 (citing Two Guys from Harrison-Al-
lentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961)).
Generally, in cases of conflict between the two religion clauses, the free exercise
clause has priority over the establishment clause. See, L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 14-8,
at 1201-04. Thus, the establishment clause argument has not fared well in free exer-
cise jurisprudence. The inherent conflict between the establishment clause and the
free exercise clause has inspired a wealth of legal commentary. See Symposium: The
Tension Between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the First
Amendment, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 289 (1986); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PIr. L. REV. 673 (1980); Evans, Contradic-
tory Demands on the First Amendment Religion Clauses: Having it Both Ways, 30 J.
CHURCH & ST. 463 (1988); Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981
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merchants objected to the law because it effectively limited them to
five business days per week since they had to close their stores on
Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath day.41 Since the Sunday closing law
was enacted for a neutral purpose, it did not impose any direct bur-
den on the group's religious practices. However, the Court was will-
ing to look beyond the religious neutrality of the statute and consider
the indirect burden of being limited to five business days per week.42
For the first time, the Court acknowledged that religiously neutral
laws can prohibit the free exercise of religion just as effectively as
laws targeted at religious conduct. By considering both direct and in-
direct burdens, the Court signaled that religious neutrality by itself,
would no longer be sufficient to uphold a law which had an impact
on the free exercise of religion. This decision broadened the scope of
the free exercise clause by treating all laws, not merely those ex-
pressly targeting religious conduct, as within its purview.
The Braunfeld Court was also willing to consider whether the
state could accomplish its secular goals by alternative means which
did not impose a burden on the group's free exercise rights. 43 To
make this determination, the Court balanced the state's asserted in-
terests against the indirect burden on the group's free exercise rights.
In applying the balancing test, the court gave considerable deference
to speculative arguments propounded by the state to justify the bur-
den on the group's religious practices.44 Consequently, the Court up-
held the Sunday closing law.45 However, the fact that the Court was
willing to weigh the burdens on free exercise rights against the
state's interests heralded a rise in the level of review above minimum
scrutiny.
Finally, in Sherbert v. Verner,46 the Court expressly held that the
compelling state interest test applies to laws which have an impact
on the free exercise of religion.47 Sherbert involved a Seventh-Day
Adventist who was discharged from her job and denied unemploy-
Sup. CT. REV. 193; Paulesn, The First Amendment Religion Causes: Two Sides Of The
Same Coin, 8 CHRISTIAN LEGAL Soc'Y Q. 13 tSpr. 1987).
41. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601-02.
42. Id. at 607.
43. Id.
44. The speculative nature of the arguments is illustrated by the Court's subjunc-
tive responses that "enforcement problems would be more difficult" and "[a]dditional
problems might also be presented" and "employers would probably have to ...." Id.
at 608-09 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 609.
46. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
47. Id. at 403.
ment benefits because she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath
day of her faith.48 She challenged the denial of unemployment bene-
fits as a violation of her free exercise rights.49 The state argued that
the statute which disqualified her from receiving benefits was neu-
trally enacted and was not intended to have an impact on religion.50
To analyze the free exercise claim, the Sherbert Court developed a
two-part test. Under the first prong of the test, the Court evaluated
whether the statute imposed any burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion.51 Just as it did in Braunfeld, the Sherbert Court looked beyond
the neutrality of a statute and considered both direct and indirect
burdens.5 2 Under the second prong of the test, the Court applied
strict scrutiny to determine whether the burden on religious prac-
tices could be justified by a compelling governmental interest.53 If
the Court found a compelling state interest, it Would then question
whether the statute was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest
through means which were the least restrictive of free exercise
rights.
In applying the test, the Court first considered whether the dis-
qualification from unemployment compensation benefits imposed any
burden on the free exercise of Mrs. Sherbert's religion. The Court
stressed that her religious beliefs were sincerely held, and that recog-
nition of the Sabbath day is a central aspect of Seventh-Day Adven-
tism.5 4 Noting that the state's ruling forced Mrs. Sherbert to choose
between forfeiting governmental benefits and violating a basic tenet
of her religion, the Court concluded that "[g]overnmental imposition
of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise
of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship."55
Having found a constitutionally significant burden, the Court pro-
48. Id. at 399400.
49. Id. at 399-401.
50. Id. at 401. Although Sherbert was the first case to apply a compelling state in-
terest test to a law which had an impact on the free exercise of religion, it was not the
first case to deal with a Seventh-Day Adventist who was denied unemployment com-
pensation benefits for refusing to work on Saturday. Compare Swenson v. Michigan
Employment Sec. Comm'n, 340 Mich. 430, 65 N.W.2d 709 (1954) (facts nearly identical
to Sherbert's, free exercise claim and unemployment compensation benefits upheld),
with Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 148 Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643 (1946), appeal
dismissed, 329 U.S. 669, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 827 (1946) (facts nearly identical to Sher-
bert's free exercise claim and unemployment compensation benefits denied).
51. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 406. To support this approach, the Court reaffirmed its belief that "in
this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."' Id. (quoting Thomas v.
,Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
54. Id. at 399 n.1.
55. Id. at 404.
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ceeded to the second prong of the test. The state asserted two inter-
ests to justify the denial of unemployment compensation benefits: (1)
the prevention of fraudulent claims for unemployment compensation,
and (2) alleviating the burden on employers which would result if
Sabbath days had to be considered when scheduling workers.5 The
Court held that neither interest was sufficiently compelling.5 7 The
Court reasoned that since the majority of the states which had con-
sidered this issue held such persons entitled to unemployment bene-
fits,58 the interests asserted by the state were speculative and
unsupported. Consequently, Mrs. Sherbert was entitled to unemploy-
ment compensation benefits.59
Subsequent cases in the employment area followed Sherbert's two-
prong, compelling state interest test.60 For example, in Thomas v.
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,6 1 the
56. Id. at 407.
57. Id.
58. Virtually every state supreme court that had faced the issue had granted un-
employment benefits to persons who were unable to find suitable employment solely
because of a religious prohibition against Saturday work. Id. at 407-08 n.7. Addition-
ally, 22 of 28 states with administrative rulings on the issue had allowed compensation
benefits to persons whose unemployment resulted from their religious objection to
working on Saturdays. Id.
59. Id. at 409.
60. For cases which are analogous to Sherbert, and which follow the decision by
allowing unemployment compensation benefits, see Murphy v. Everett, 5 Ark. App.
281, 635 S.W.2d 301 (1982); Lincoln v. True, 408 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Dotter v.
Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 435 A.2d 1368 (Me. 1981); Key State Bank v. Adams,
138 Mich. App. 607, 360 N.W.2d 909 (1984); St. Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 377
A.2d 620 (1977); Marvin v. Giles, 11 Ohio App. 3d 57, 463 N.E.2d 80 (1983); DuPont v.
Employment Div., 80 Ore. App. 776, 723 P.2d 1073 (1986); Monroe v. Commonwealth,
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 535 A.2d 1222 (1988); Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth. v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd., 54 Pa. Commw.
165, 420 A.2d 47 (1980); Nottelson v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Rela-
tions, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980).
For cases distinguishing Sherbert and denying unemployment compensation benefits,
see Haig v. Everett, 8 Ark. App. 255, 650 S.W.2d 593 (1983); Hildebrand v. Unemploy-
ment Ins. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 765, 566 P.2d 1297, 140 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1977), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978); Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n of Colo., 618 P.2d 738
(Colo. App. 1980); Bolden v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 40
Conn. Supp. 208, 485 A.2d 1379 (1984); Smalls v. State, 485 So. 2d 1, review denied, 492
So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 1985); Flynn v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 448 A.2d 905 (Me.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983); In Re Claim of D'Amico, 122 App. Div. 2d 472,
504 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1986); Donnelly v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation
Bd. of Review, 17 Pa. Commw. 39, 330 A.2d 544 (1975); DePriest v. Bible, 653 S.W.2d
721, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 903, reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 933 (1981), later proceeding 669
S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. 1980); Wilson v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, Dep't of Employment Sec.,
638 P.2d 529 (Utah 1981).
61. 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981). See also Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec.,
489 U.S. 829 (1989).
Court applied strict scrutiny and held that a Jehovah's Witness did
not lose unemployment benefits when his termination resulted from
his refusal to work on military weapons because of his conscientious
objection to war. And in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commis-
sion of Florida,62 the Court was faced with facts nearly identical to
those in Sherbert.63 Consequently, the Court simply reaffirmed the
applicability of the Sherbert two-prong compelling state interest test,
and summarily upheld the free exercise claim.64
In addition to unemployment benefits claims, the Sherbert test has
been applied to a wide variety of free exercise cases. For example,
the Supreme Court has invoked the free exercise clause to exempt
conscientious objectors from serving in the military,6 5 and to invali-
date a law which prohibited ministers from running for public of-
fice.66  The peak of free exercise jurisprudence occurred in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,6 7 when the Court held that the state cannot
compel Amish children to attend public school beyond the age of
fourteen when doing so would conflict with their parents' religious
beliefs.68 In addition, various lower courts have allowed the free ex-
ercise clause to be used as a defense to various tort causes of action,
including defamation, invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional dis-
tress, fraud, interference with business relationships, and false
imprisonment.6 9
62. 480 U.S. 136 (1986).
63. The claimant in Hobbie was a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on
Saturday, her Sabbath day. The only significant distinction between Sherbert and Hob-
bie is that Paula Hobbie had been working Saturdays for her employer for over two
years before joining the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. The state argued that she
was "the 'agent of change' and is therefore responsible for the consequences of the
conflict between her job and her religious beliefs." Id. at 143. The state asserted "that
it is ... unfair for an employee to adopt religious beliefs that conflict with existing
employment and expect to continue the employment without compromising those be-
liefs and that this 'intentional disregard of the employer's interest ... constitutes mis-
conduct.'" Id. at 143-44 (quoting Brief for Appellee Appeals Commission at 20-21).
However, the Court rejected this analysis holding that "[t]he timing of Hobbie's con-
version is immaterial to our determination that her free exercise rights have been bur-
dened." Id. at 144. See also inrja note 102 for a discussion of the significance of the
Court's refusal to consider this distinction.
64. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141, 146.
65. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), rehg denied, 402 U.S. 934 (up-
holding statutory exemption for persons with religious objections to all war); United
States v. X, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (same). But see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970) (claimant without sincere religious beliefs not exempted from military service).
66. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
67. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
68. Id. at 235-36.
69. See Annotation, Free Exercise of Religion Clause of First Amendment as De-
fense to Tort Liability, 93 A.L.R. FED. 754 (1989).
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B. The Peyote Cases
A number of cases have considered the conflict between secular
drug enforcement laws which prohibit the possession and use of pe-
yote, and religious laws of North American Indians which require pe-
yote use in religious ceremonies.70 State and federal courts have
reached varying conclusions as to whether the free exercise clause
exempts religious peyote users from the reach of drug enforcement
laws. This section tracks the development of case law dealing with
this issue.71
The earliest notable case addressing whether the free exercise
clause protects the sacramental use of peyote is the Montana
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Big Sheep.72 In Big Sheep, a
Crow Indian was arrested in Montana for unlawful possession of pe-
yote.73 The trial court devoted considerable effort to determining
whether the defendant's possession and use of peyote was truly for
religious purposes.74 The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case
on a jurisdictional issue, but provided guidance to the lower court on
Big Sheep's free exercise claim.75 In the court's view, "[i]t was
clearly within the power of the legislature to determine whether the
practice of using peyote is inconsistent with the good order, peace,
and safety of the state," or opposed to the civil authority thereof.76
Thus, the court never seriously questioned the power of the legisla-
ture to ban the use of peyote, and consequently rejected Big Sheep's
free exercise claim.
In People v. Woody,77 the first major peyote case decided after
70. For literature discussing the use and history of peyote in religious ceremonies,
see E. ANDERSON, PEYOTE, THE DIVINE CACTUS (1979); A. HuXLEY, THE DOORS OF PER-
CEPTION (1970); 0. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY (1987).
71. Peyote is not the only issue in which NAC members have raised free exercise
claims. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (Indians challenged road construction through Indian burial ground on free ex-
ercise basis); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (Indian unsuccessfully claimed that
government's use of social security number robbed his daughter's spirit in violation of
the free exercise clause); Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974) (free exercise
clause did not exempt Indian children from public school dress code which prohibited
wearing long braided hair); New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert
denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (same); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa
1974) (free exercise clause exempted Indian from prison hair-length regulations).
72. 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926).
73. Id. at 222, 243 P. at 1068.
74. Id. at 238, 243 P. at 1072-73.
75. Id. at 238-39, 243 P. at 1073.
76. Id. at 239, 243 P. at 1074.
77. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
Sherbert, the 'California Supreme Court took a more tolerant ap-
proach. In applying the Sherbert two-part test, the court first deter-
mined that a criminal prohibition of peyote use imposed a substantial
burden on the free exercise rights of a Navajo Indian group.78 In
reaching this conclusion, the court considered the use, history and
"centrality" of peyote in the Native American Church (NAC).79 In
applying the second prong of the Sherbert test, the court questioned
whether the state had an interest sufficiently compelling to warrant
the burden imposed on the group's free exercise rights. The state as-
serted a plethora of interests, including the duty to protect Indians
from the deleterious effects of peyote,8 0 the threat that fraudulent
religious claims would inhibit the uniform enforcement of its narcot-
ics laws,S1 and the difficulty of establishing the sincerity of religious
claims.8 2 The Woody court held none of these interests sufficiently
compelling to warrant the burden imposed on the Indian group's free
exercise rights.8 3 As a result, the group's possession and use of pe-
yote was constitutionally protected.8 4
78. Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74. "To forbid the use of peyote is to
remove the theological heart of peyotism." Id.
79. Id. at 720-22, 394 P.2d at 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-74. "Centrality" is a term of
art in free exercise jurisprudence which refers to the relative traditional significance
of a particular belief or act in the exercise of a religion. Centrality has arisen in free
exercise cases because some courts have reasoned that there is no constitutionally sig-
nificant burden on the free exercise of religion if a law has an impact on only a minor
tenet of a religion. However, the Smith II Court determined 'that courts are not com-
petent to evaluate centrality. See infra text accompanying notes 242-45.
80. The state asserted that the use of peyote "'obstructs enlightenment and
shackles the Indian to primitive conditions.'" Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 723, 394 P.2d at
818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74; see Note, Native American Religious Freedom and the Peyote
Sacrament: The Precarious Balance Between State Interests and the Free Exercise
Clause, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 423, 426 (1989). In a solid display of respect for Indian culture,
the court summarily rejected the state's culturally arrogant argument. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d at 723, 394 P.2d at 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
81. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 723-26, 394 P.2d at 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-76.
82. Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The court rejected this argument
based on United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), rev'd, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), which
held that judicial 'inquiry into the truth or validity of religious beliefs is foreclosed by
the first amendment. Even if the state's arguments carried any legal weight, they
were inapplicable in the Woody case because it was not disputed that the claimants'
use of peyote was for sincere religious purposes. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 726-27, 394 P.2d
at 820-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77. Interestingly, on the same day the California Supreme
Court upheld the religious exception in Woody, it also denied a religious exception for
the sacramental use of peyote in a separate case based primarily on the claimant's lack
of sincerity or good faith belief in the doctrines of the NAC. See In re Grady, 61 Cal.
2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
83. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77. To support its
holding, the Woody court noted that the Arizona Supreme Court had already carved a
judicial exception for the sacramental use of peyote by interpreting its peyote statute
as inapplicable to members of the NAC. Id. at 724 n.5, 394 P.2d at 819 n.5, 40 Cal. Rptr.
at 75 n.5 (citing Arizona v. Attaka, Criminal No. 4098, Coconino County, July 26,
1960).
84. But see Golden Eagle v. Johnson, 493 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975). In Golden Eagle, an Indian was arrested for possession of peyote.
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The judicial reaction to the Woody decision was mixed. In White-
horn v. State,8 5 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals followed Woody by
holding that a sincere belief in the practices of the NAC was a valid
defense to a prosecution for possession of peyote.8 6 Several other
state courts have similarly granted an exemption for the sacramental
use of peyote by applying Sherbert's two-prong compelling state in-
terest test.8 7 Some courts have acknowledged that NAC members
are exempt from criminal peyote laws, but have denied the exemp-
tion based on lack of sincere belief in Peyotism.8 8 Other less tolerant
courts have refused to exempt NAC members from prosecution for
possession of peyote, because they perceived uniform enforcement of
criminal drug laws as a compelling governmental interest.8 9 For ex-
ample, in State v. Soto,90 the Oregon Court of Appeals, apathetic to-
wards the interests of the NAC, upheld the defendant's criminal
peyote possession conviction.
The Indian made no attempt to conceal the peyote and confidently asserted that as a
member of the NAC, his possession and use of peyote was constitutionally protected.
The arresting officers ignored Golden Eagle's assertions, and kept him incarcerated for
thirty-one days, pending criminal prosecution. The criminal charges were eventually
dropped, and Golden Eagle complained that the police's failure to ascertain the validity
of his free exercise claim, the seizure of the peyote, and his ensuing thirty-one-day in-
carceration constituted a violation of his constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, applying California law and accepting the validity of the Woody decision,
held that no special pre-arrest and pre-seizure procedures are required to determine
bonafide religious beliefs. Id. at 1186. Thus, although a NAC member cannot be crimi-
nally prosecuted for peyote use in California, he or she may be arrested and detained
pending a judicial determination that the religious beliefs are sincerely held.
85. 561 P.2d 539 (1977).
86. Id. at 547.
87. See Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 651 F.-Supp. 483 (D.N.M. 1986), rev'd, 892 F.2d
1481 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2208 (1990); Native American Church of
New York v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), sff'd, 633 F.2d 205 (2d
Cir. 1980); Warner v. Graham, 675 F. Supp. 1171 (D.N.D. 1987), rev'd, 845 F.2d 178 (8th
Cir. 1988); Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (1977).
88. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Tex. 1983);
Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973).
89. In State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
917 (1967), the defendant was convicted for possession of peyote and marijuana despite
his assertion that his actions were protected by the free exercise clause. Not only did
the court doubt the sincerity of the defendant's religious beliefs, but also stated that
"[e]ven if he were sincere, the first amendment could not protect him." Id. at 603, 148
S.E.2d at 568. See also, Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal. Council, 272 F.2d 131
(10th Cir. 1959) (declining jurisdiction to determine validity of Navajo Indian nation
rule against possession of peyote); Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert
denied, 372 U.S. 908 (1963) (refusing to invalidate Department of Interior's ban on
peyote).
90. 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
In 1977, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court impliedly
approved of the approach taken by the Woody court. In McDaniel v.
Paty,91 Chief Justice Burger referred to the Woody case as "illustra-
tive of the general nature of free exercise protections and the deli-
cate balancing required by our decisions in Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder."9 2 Although the Supreme Court did not review
the conclusions reached in Woody, Justice Brennan, in his concur-
rence, clearly indicated that it was proper to apply the Sherbert two-
part, compelling state interest test to the criminal peyote law evalu-
ated in the Woody decision.9 3
Another repercussion of Woody was a flood of cases in which per-
sons arrested for drugs, other than peyote, argued that their drug use
was religiously motivated and protected by the free exercise clause.
Most notably, in Leary v. United States,94 Harvard professor Timothy
Leary claimed that his use of marijuana and LSD was related to his
devout beliefs in Hinduism.95 The court declined to extend the free
exercise exemption to Leary's recreational drug use because it ques-
tioned whether the drugs were necessary tenets of Hinduism.96 In
fact, no court has ever extended a free exercise exception for the use
of marijuana, heroin, or LSD.97
Perhaps the most important post-Woody case, for purposes of ana-
lyzing the Smith decisions, is Warner v. Graham,98 which involved
facts nearly identical to those in Smith. The plaintiff in Warner was
an NAC member working as a counselor in a drug rehabilitation
center. The court found that her credibility as an addiction counselor
was dependent upon her abstinence from drugs.99 However, in 1984,
she was arrested for possession of peyote100 Although the criminal
91. 435 U.S. 618 (1977).
92. Id. at 628 n.8 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
93. Id. at 633-34 (Brennan J., concurring in judgment).
94. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); see also United States v.
Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (no religious exemption for group formed merely
to use and enjoy drugs).
95. Leary, 383 F.2d at 857.
96. Id. at 860. Six months after his conviction, Leary founded his own "religion,"
in which the followers were required to use marijuana daily and LSD weekly. This
"religion" was called the League of Spiritual Development (LSD). See Note, supra
note 80 at 429 n.65 (citing M. KoNvrrz, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 62-65
(1968)).
97. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1620 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see, e.g., Lewellyn v. State, 489 P.2d 511 (1971) (marijuana conviction upheld against
free exercise claim); see generally Annotation, Free Exercise of Religion as Defense to
Prosecution for Narcotic or Psychedelic Drug Offense, 35 A.L.R. 3D 939 (1971 & Supp.
1989) (reviewing cases denying exemption for prosecution for marijuana, heroin, and
LSD); Noonan, How Sincere Do You Have To Be To Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv.
713 (analyzing sincerity requirement).
98. 675 F. Supp. 1171 (D.N.D. 1987).
99. Id. at 1175 n.1.
100. Id. at 1173.
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charges were dropped, Warner was temporarily suspended by her
employer.' 0 ' After extensive administrative proceedings, she was
eventually reinstated to other duties. She subsequently resigned and
applied for unemployment compensations benefits,102 but the Depart-
ment of Human Services denied her 'claim.103 Upon appeal, the Ap-
peals Referee initially found that the Department had failed to prove
that the suspension was a result of misconduct,104 but upon future re-
view, he ruled that "her admitted use of peyote.., has adversely af-
fected both her credibility and integrity and is detrimental to her
employer's interest."'10 5
On judicial review, the United States District Court applied Sher-
bert's two-part, compelling state interest test to evaluate whether the
suspension and denial of unemployment benefits violated Warner's
free exercise rights.106 Applying the first prong of the test, the court
determined that her suspension and denial of benefits created a sub-
stantial burden on her religious practices. 0 7 Applying the second
prong of the test, the court found that the state had a compelling in-
terest in controlling dangerous drugs, and that the employer's refusal
to reinstate Warner to her counseling duties "was appropriate in light
of its compelling interest in the continuing viability of its drug and
alcohol education program."108 However, the court determined that
suspending Warner's employment was not the least restrictive means
of accomplishing these interests. Instead, Warner's employer should
have offered her alternative employment in which her peyote use
would not jeopardize her credibility.'0 9 Therefore, Warner was held
not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits during the
period of her suspension.no
III. BACKGROUND OF THE SMITH CASES
A. Facts
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were employed as drug counselors
for the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Preven-
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1174.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1175.
105. Id. at 1175 n.1.
106. Id. at 1177.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1178-79 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 1178.
110. Id. at 1179.
tion and Treatment (ADAPT), a private, non-profit drug rehabilita-
tion facility.1 Because Smith and Black had overcome former drug
and alcohol dependencies, they were well-suited to help others battle
against substance abuse. As a condition of employment, ADAPT re-
quired that all counselors act as role models for its patients by ab-
staining from recreational drug and alcohol use, whether legal or
illegal.112
Black first came into contact with the NAC through Smith, a sixty-
four year old Klamath Indian, who was a member of the NAC,113 and
Black's co-worker at ADAPT.114 As part of an NAC ceremony,
Black ingested a small amount of peyote.115 Although the amount of
peyote he consumed was insufficient to produce any hallucinogenic
reaction, ADAPT's personnel rules provided that misuse of mind-al-
tering substances might constitute grounds for discipline.116 After
learning of Black's activities, ADAPT fired him, citing intentional vi-
olation of employer rules.117 Some months later, after receiving
warnings from ADAPT regarding peyote use, Smith informed
ADAPT that he, too, intended to ingest peyote at an upcoming NAC
ceremony.n 8 The employer warned Smith that any use of peyote
would violate his duty to abstain from drugs and that he could be
fired. Smith attended the NAC ceremony and ingested a small quan-
tity of peyote. He was promptly discharged by ADAPT upon a deter-
mination that his consumption of peyote impaired his ability to serve
as a legitimate role model to recovering alcoholics and drug abus-
ers.119 Following their dismissals, both Black and Smith applied to
the Oregon Employment Division for unemployment compensation
111. Black v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 737, 707 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990); Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 211, 721 P.2d 445-
46 (1986) [hereinafter Smith-Oregon 7.] cert. granted, 480 U.S. 916 (1987), vacated, 485
U.S. 660 (1988), cert. grant d, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
112. Black, 75 Or. App. at 737, 707 P.2d at 1276; Smith Oregon I, 301 Or. at 211, 721
P.2d at 446. Since none of the courts hearing the Smith case suggested that Smith's
employer had banned the use of medicinal drugs, it can be inferred that Smith's em-
ployer required abstention only from illegally possessed, recreational drugs.
113. Smith Oregon 1, 301 Or. at 211, 721 P.2d at 446.
114. Black, 75 Or. App. at 737, 707 P.2d at 1276. Although Black had only recently
adopted the beliefs of the NAC, Smith had been a lifetime member. The Supreme
Court has held this distinction to be irrelevant to the analysis of a free exercise claim.
See supra note 63.
115. Black, 745 Or. App. at 737, 707 P.2d at 1276.
116. Id.
117. Black's action was characterized as "misconduct," which is a term of art in this
case because it is the legal basis upon which the Employment Division could justifiably
deny unemployment benefits to a particular applicant. The standards for misconduct
are individually defined by each private employer, depending on the job's require-
ments. See infra text accompanying notes 137-45 for a complete discussion of the rele-
vance of this term.
118. Smith Oregon I, 301 Or. at 212, 721 P.2d at 446.
119. Id.
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benefits.12
B. Procedural History
Although Oregon's criminal drug law provides no exception for the
sacramental use of peyote, Smith was never arrested, prosecuted,
convicted, nor sentenced under this criminal statute. His free exer-
cise claim was based on the state's rejection of his unemployment
compensation benefits claim, which was predicated. on Oregon's un-
employment statutes. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court believed that
the constitutionality of the criminal law was properly presented and
ripe for review. However, if the constitutional issue was not properly
presented, then the validity of the second Smith decision is question-
able.' 2 ' In order to enable the reader to evaluate whether the consti-
tutional issue was properly presented* in Smith II, this section will
examine the administrative and state court proceedings which pre-
ceded Smith I, the Supreme Court's 'first hearing of the case.
The extensive procedural history of the Smith cases began when
the Employment Division, in two separate decisions, respectively de-
nied Smith's and Black's claims for unemployment compensation. 22
At an administrative hearing to review the denial of Smith's unem-
ployment benefits, the referee held in favor of Smith, reasoning that
the state interest in guaranteeing the solvency of the Unemployment
Trust Fund was not threatened by granting benefits to claimants
whose religious beliefs conflicted with their employment.123 In
Black's case, the referee ruled that the peyote use was merely an iso-
lated incident of misconduct which was insufficient to warrant the
denial of unemployment benefits.l24 However, in reviewing both
cases together, the Employment Appeals Board (EAB) reversed
them. 2 5 In Smith's case, the EAB was concerned about the impact
on the unemployment trust fund.1 In Black's case, the EAB fo-
cused its analysis on the willful nature of Black's misconduct and the
120. Id.; Black, 75 Or. App. at 738, 707 P.2d at 1276.
121. The doctrine of ripeness requires courts to exercise judicial restraint by declin-
ing to decide issues not properly presented by the facts of the case. If a court is
presented with merely the bare bones of an unenforced statute,-then it should require
a more complete factual record before deciding whether the statute passes constitu-
tional muster. See generally TREATISE, supra note 18, § 2.13(d), at 115-19.
122. Black, 75 Or. App. at 738, 707 P.2d at 1276; Smith Oregon 1, 301 Or. at 212, 721
P.2d at 446.
123. Smith Oregon 1, 301 Or. at 212, 721 P.2d at 446.
124. Black, 75 Or. App. at 738, 707 P.2d at 1276.
125. Id. at 739, 707 P.2d at 1277; Smith Oregon 1, 301 Or. at 212, 721 P.2d at 446.
126. Smith, 301 Or. at 212, 721 P.2d at 446.
illegality of ingesting peyote.127
On judicial review, the Oregon Court of Appeals felt that the EAB
failed to consider the importance of Smith's and Black's constitu-
tional claims to free exercise of religion. 28 Applying the Sherbert
two-part test, the court first found that the denial of unemployment
benefits substantially burdened their free exercise rights.i29 As to
the second prong of the test, the court held that there was no state
interest sufficiently compelling to warrant denying unemployment
benefits.130 However, the court was unable to determine whether the
use of peyote by Smith.and Black was truly a religious act. As a re-
sult, the court remanded the cases for further factual findings to de-
termine the sincerity of Smith's and Black's religious assertions.13 '
The Oregon Supreme Court heard the Smith and Black cases in
tandem. Although the court issued separate written opinions for
each claimant, 32 the constitutional analysis appears primarily in the
Smith opinion. First, the court considered the Oregon unemploy-
ment compensation statute which "disqualifies claimants who have
been discharged for what an employer validly considers misconduct
connected with the employment."'133 Since Smith did not contest his
employer's right to fire him, but only contested the state's code
which denied him unemployment benefits, the Court proceeded to
assess the constitutionality of the Oregon Code under the Oregon
Constitution.134 The court held that the "misconduct" statute was
neutrally enacted with regard to religion and that its impact on reli-
gion was merely incidental. 3 5 Consequently, the Oregon Supreme
127. Black, 75 Or. App. at 739, 707 P.2d at 1277. Oregon prohibits the possession of
"controlled substances." OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987). "Controlled substances"
are expressly defined as drugs appearing in Schedules I through V of the Federal Con-
trolled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812 (1982).
128. Black, 75 Or. App. at 740, 707 P.2d at 1277-78. The court of appeals issued a
full written opinion in Black's case and summarily remanded Smith's case stating sim-
ply: "Reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of Black v. Employment Di-
vision .... " Smith Oregon I, 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246 (citation omitted).
129. Black, 75 Or. App. at 741; 707 P.2d at 1278.
130. Id.
131. I. at 742-43; 707 P.2d at 1278-79. "Sincerity" is another term of art in free ex-
ercise jurisprudence. It refers to whether a claimant holds sincere religious beliefs.
Sincerity is considered by courts that suspect that the claimants before them do not
hold good faith religious beliefs and are using religion and the Constitution as a cloak
for illegal activities. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of
free exercise claims held to be insincere.
132. Smith Oregon 1, 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445 (1986); Black v. Employment Div.,
301 Or. 221, 721 P.2d 451 (1986).
133. Smith Oregon I, 301 Or. 214-15, 721 P.2d 448 (citing OR. REV. STAT.
§ 657.176(2)(a)(1987)). "An individual shall be disqualified from the receipt of benefits
... if ... the individual ... [h]as been discharged for misconduct connected with
work." Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a)).
134. Id. at 215; 721 P.2d at 448.
135. Id. at 216, 721 P.2d at 448.
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Court concluded that the statute did not violate the Oregon
Constitution.13 6
The court then analyzed the "misconduct" statute under the Fed-
eral Constitution by applying the Sherbert two-part, compelling state
interest test. 3 7 In the first part of the test, the court held that the
denial of unemployment benefits significantly burdened Smith's free
exercise rights. 38 Applying the second prong of the test, the court
held that the state's interest in preserving the financial integrity of
the Unemployment Trust Fund was not compelling. 3 9 The court felt
that the Employment Appeals Board's asserted interest in proscrib-
ing the use of illegal drugs was irrelevant.140 The court believed that
the state's interest in denying unemployment compensation benefits
must stem from unemployment compensation statutes, not from
criminal drug laws.141 This reasoning comports with the Warner de-
cision.142 Even if peyote were legal, or if Oregon provided a religious
exception, Smith's use of peyote would still constitute misconduct be-
cause he intentionally impaired his ability to perform his function as
a role model to recovering drug addicts and alcoholics.
The court held similarly for Black by simply referring to its analy-
sis in the Smith opinion.143 Rather than remanding to the Court of
Appeals, the court remanded both cases directly to the Employment
Appeals Board, essentially ordering them to provide unemployment
benefits to Smith and Black.144 Upon the Employment Division's pe-
tition, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and con-
solidated the cases.145
IV. ANALYSIS OF SMITH I
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 4 6 stipulated that legiti-
136. Id. at 215-16, 721 P.2d at 448-49.
137. Id at 217-20, 721 P.2d at 449-51.
138. Id. at 215, 721 P.2d at 450.
139. Id. at 218-20, 721 P.2d at 450-51.
140. Id. at 218-19, 721 P.2d at 450.
141. Id. at 219, 721 P.2d at 450.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 98-110.
143. Black v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 221, 225, 721 P.2d 451, 453.
144. Id. at 227, 721 P.2d at 454; Smith Oregon 1, 301 Or. at 220, 721 P.2d at 451.
145. 480 U.S. 916 (1987). For simplicity, the remainder of this Note refers only to
Mr. Smith. However, each reference to Smith includes a reference to Mr. Black, un-
less otherwise noted.
146. Smith I, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice
macy, centrality, and sincerity were not at issue. He observed that
there was no debate as to whether the NAC was a bona fide religion,
whether peyote use was an important tenet in the NAC,i47 or
whether Smith was a good faith believer and member of the NAC.148
The legal issue, according to the Court, was whether Oregon's refusal
to provide unemployment compensation benefits violated Smith's
free exercise rights.149
The majority in Smith I was disturbed by the state court's failure
to address the significance of Oregon laws making peyote possession
a felony.150 The Court assumed that if the state could prohibit the
use of peyote through its criminal laws without violating Smith's free
exercise rights, then it could certainly impose the "lesser burden" of
denying unemployment benefits.151
The Smith I Court recognized that this assumption conflicted with
the frequently cited excerpt from Sherbert which states that
"[g]overnmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship." 52 In order to reconcile
its position, the majority stressed that, in Sherbert and its progeny,
the acts which conflicted with the employers' interests were legal,
whereas Smith's use of peyote might have been illegal. 5 3 Justice
Stevens explained that the results in "Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie
might well have been different if the employees had been discharged
for engaging in criminal conduct."' 5 4
The problem with this reasoning is that Smith was not discharged
for engaging in criminal conduct. He was discharged only for "mis-
conduct."155 ADAPT's concern was that Smith's use of peyote im-
paired his ability to serve as a role model for recovering patients.
There is no indication that ADAPT was concerned about the illegal-
ity of peyote. Whether peyote was legal or not, Smith's use of it pre-
vented him from performing his job and was the basis for his
termination.
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Kennedy took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
147. Id. at 663. The majority acknowledged the importance of peyote to North
American Indian religions by reprinting a lengthy description of the NAC and its his-
torical use of peyote which first appeared in Woody, the California Peyote case. Id. at
667-68 n.11 (Peyotism, an unfamiliar practice to most Americans, is described in
Woody)
148. Smith I, 485 U.S. it 663.
149. Smith -Oregon 1, 301 Or. at 212, 721 P.2d at 446.
150. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 672.
151. Id. at 670.
152. Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
153. Id. at 671.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, Smith was not denied unemployment benefits because
his conduct was illegal. The Employment Division had admitted to
the Oregon Supreme Court that "the commission of an illegal act is
not, in and of itself, grounds for disqualification from unemployment
benefits,"l5 6 rather the rejection was based on an unemployment
compensation statute which denies benefits to persons discharged for
"misconduct," as defined by their employers.157 Under the statute,
every private employer is free to establish its own rules regarding
what actions constitute misconduct.158 Smith's employer considered
any drug use by its counselors, whether legal or illegal, to constitute
misconduct because it significantly impaired their ability to function
as role models. As the Oregon Court of Appeals stated,
[tihe fact that there is an independent set of criminal laws which made his
conduct coincidentally illegal is irrelevant, because he was not terminated for
breaking the law. The question is not whether the state's action can be justi-
fied by the compelling interest of protecting the health and interest of the
public. The justification is not advanced, nor could it be, because the relevant
state action is not a criminal charge, as in Soto, but the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits.1 5 9
In Smith I, Smith argued that peyote use was analogous to the
"sacramental use of small quantities of alcohol in Christian religious
ceremonies."'16 However, his employer had previously testified to
the Oregon court that its counselors would have been similarly dis-
charged for misconduct had they legally -consumed alcohol, because
any use of drugs or alcohol by a treatment counselor threatens the
ability of a drug rehabilitation center to perform its function.' 6 '
Although the consumption of alcohol is not illegal, if Smith had con-
sumed any alcoholic beverage, including wine, he could have been
discharged for misconduct and denied unemployment compensation.
Similarly, if peyote were legal, Smith still would have been dis-
charged for misconduct and denied unemployment benefits. Thus,
the illegality of peyote was irrelevant in determining whether the de-
nial of unemployment benefits was proper. Smith's use of peyote af-
fected his credibility because his unique position as a drug counselor
required that he abstain from all addictive substances. If Smith had
chosen virtually any other line of work, his peyote use would not
have affected his ability to perform responsibilities as a role model.
156. Smith Oregon I, 301 Or. 209, 219, 721'P.2d 445, 450 (1986).
157. See supra note 133.
158. 301 Or. at 214-15, 721 P.2d at 448.
159. Black v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 744; 707 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1985).
160. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 669.
161. 301 Or. at 223, 721 P.2d at 452.
Although the illegality of peyote had no bearing on Smith's mis-
conduct for the purposes of unemployment compensation benefits,
the majority in Smith I nevertheless concluded that the constitution-
ality of Oregon's unemployment compensation code hinged on
whether Smith's sacramental use of peyote was illegal in Oregon.8 2
Since the court was uncertain whether Oregon provided an exception
to its criminal drug law for the sacramental use of peyote, the case
was remanded to the Oregon Supreme Court for a clarification of
state law on this issue. 6 3
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan felt that the Employment Division had no real in-
terest in enforcing the state's criminal drug laws,x6 4 because it was
apparent from the record that drug enforcement was not the in-
tended goal of the legislature when it enacted its unemployment stat-
utes.16 To support his position, Justice Brennan noted that the state
court had disregarded the Employment Division's asserted interest in
proscribing the use of dangerous drugs. The Oregon Supreme Court
was unequivocal on this point as evidenced by its statement that
"[t]he state's interest in denying unemployment benefits to a claim-
ant discharged for religiously motivated misconduct must be found in
the unemployment compensation statutes, not in the criminal stat-
utes proscribing the use of peyote."' 66 Justice Brennan also recog-
nized that the illegality of peyote was irrelevant to the determination
of whether Smith's use of peyote constituted "misconduct" for which
he could be fired and denied unemployment benefits under Oregon's
employment statutes. 6 7 Justice Brennan resolved that the Supreme
Court "may not assert on a State's behalf interests that the State
does not have."'1 6 Since in his view the constitutional question was
not properly presented, and the Employment Division failed to assert
any valid interests other than those which the Court had already re-
162. As a point of comparison, it should be noted that the district court in Warner
considered facts which were similar to Smith. The Warner court recognized that the
illegality of peyote was irrelevant in determining whether the sacramental use of pe-
yote by a drug rehabilitation counselor constituted "misconduct" for which unemploy-
ment compensation benefits could be denied. See supra notes 98-110 and
accompanying text. Consequently, the court refrained from evaluating the constitu-
tionality of the criminal law which prohibited all use of peyote. The Warner court
simply applied the Sherbert two-part test to evaluate whether the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits violated Warner's free exercise rights. Warner v. Graham, 675 F. Supp.
1171, 1177 (D.N.D. 1987).
163. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 673-74.
164. Id. at 678-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 676-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Smith Oregon 1, 301 Or. 209, 219, 721 P.2d 445, 450 (1986),
167. See supra text accompanying notes 152-63.
168. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 679 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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jected in Sherbert, Justice Brennan concluded that the Oregon
Supreme Court's decision should have been affirmed.169
C. On Remand to the Oregon Supreme Court
In its first Smith opinion, the Oregon Supreme Court considered
whether its unemployment statutes violated either the Oregon or
United States Constitutions,170 but did not determine whether the
state's criminal peyote laws violated the Oregon Constitution. Since
the United States Supreme Court ruled that Smith's free exercise
claim was dependent on Oregon's criminal laws, the Court remanded
with instructions to the Oregon Supreme Court to determine
whether Oregon provided an exception to its criminal drug laws for
the sacramental use of peyote.171
This issue had already been addressed in State v. Soto,172 Oregon's
only reported criminal peyote case. In Soto, the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals upheld the conviction of an Indian who had been arrested, pros-
ecuted and sentenced under the state's criminal peyote laws.173 The
court rejected Soto's religious defense, 174 even though Soto demon-
strated that his religious beliefs were authentic and sincerely held.
Although Soto remains valid law with regard to Oregon's criminal
drug laws, because it was an appellate decision, it was not binding on
the Oregon Supreme Court. Moreover, the court had previously sug-
gested in Black v. Employment Division 175 that Soto be reexamined
because Congress had declared in the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act that it is "the policy of the United States to protect and
preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to be-
lieve, express, and exercise . . . traditional religions."'176 The Black
judges noted that the result in Soto was inconsistent with the major-
ity of western states which now provide an express exemption to
their criminal drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote.177 The
Oregon Supreme Court had also recognized this trend in its first
169. Id.
170. Smith Oregon I, 301 Or. 209, 212-20, 721 P.2d 445, 446-49 (1986).
171. Smith 1, 485 U.S. at 672.
172. State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 955
(1976).
173. Sote, 21 Or. App. at 798, 537 P.2d at 144.
174. Id.
175. 75 Or. App. 735, 744 n.9, 707 P.2d 1274, 1280 n.9. (1985).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982) (emphasis added); see also note 299, infra, discussing
Congress' intent to protect Indian culture and provide a national exception from fed-
eral criminal drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote.
177. Black, 75 Or. App. at 744 n.8, 707 P.2d at 1280 n.8.
Smith decision by quoting a passage from Woody, the leading Califor-
nia decision acknowledging the rights of Indians to use peyote in reli-
gious ceremonies. 78 Thus, the United States Supreme Court was
justified in considering the possibility that the Oregon Supreme
Court could create a judicial or state constitutional exception to its
criminal drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote.179
However, without providing any legal analysis, or even citing Soto,
the Oregon court summarily concluded that "the Oregon statute
against possession of controlled substances, which include peyote,
makes no exception for the sacramental use of peyote."'180 Addition-
ally, rather than evaluating whether Oregon's criminal peyote law
could pass state constitutional muster, the court proceeded to analyze
whether the criminal law violated the federal constitution.181 The
court cited authority supporting the proposition that Congress in-
tended to preserve and protect the Native American Indian culture
and its religious beliefs.182 In so doing, the state court found that its
criminal drug laws conflicted with the federal Constitution. 183
The United States Supreme Court, however, had never asked the
Oregon court for an analysis under the federal constitution. The
Court specifically ruled that "a necessary predicate to a correct evalu-
ation of [Smith's] federal claim is an understanding of the legality of
[his] conduct as a matter of state law."'184 Although the Supreme
Court clearly requested "guidance concerning the status of the [sacra-
mental use of peyote] as a matter of Oregon law,"185 the Oregon
Supreme Court neglected to evaluate whether the unconditional pro-
hibition against peyote violated the Oregon Constitution. If the
Supreme Court required an analysis of the federal constitution, it
certainly would have done so itself without remanding to the state
court.
Knowing that the United States Supreme Court intended to hinge
Smith's claim on the legality of peyote in Oregon, 86 the Oregon
178. Smith Oregon 1, 301 Or. 221, 225-27, 721 P.2d 451, 453-54 (quoting People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-21, 394 P.2d 813, 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-72 (1964)).
179. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 673.
180. Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988), cert
granted, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) [hereinafter Smith Oregon
II.
181. Id. at 73.
182. Id. at 74-75. Arguably, the expressed intention of Congress to protect the reli-
gions of this culture violates the establishment clause of the United States
Constitution.
183. Id. at 75-76.
184. Smith 1, 485 U.S. at 672 (emphasis added).
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. The Court expressed its intentions on this issue clearly. The majority stated:
A substantial number of jurisdictions have exempted the use of peyote in reli-
gious ceremonies from legislative prohibitions against the use and possession
of controlled substances. If Oregon is one of those States, [Smith's] conduct
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Supreme Court could have provided Smith with his unemployment
benefits by simply overruling Soto, and thereby carving a judicial ex-
ception to the state's criminal statute in order to accommodate the
sacramental use of peyote. Alternatively, the Oregon court could
have held that the Oregon Constitution requires the religious exemp-
tion. However, despite the modern trend in other states to exempt
sacramental peyote use from criminal drug laws, and the congres-
sional mandate which the court so persuasively set forth, the Oregon
Supreme Court failed to evaluate whether the Oregon Constitution'
or the criminal statute itself required the religious exception. As a
result, when the case was heard once again by the United States
Supreme Court, the Court could look only to the plain words of the
state court's opinion which stated that Oregon provides no religious
exception for the sacramental use of peyote.18 7 Thus, the stage was
finally set for the Supreme Court's ground-breaking decision when
the Court heard the case a second time in Smith II.
V. ANALYSIS OF SMITH II
A. The Mqoority Opinion
1. General Information
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 8 8 commenced by identify-
ing the specific Oregon criminal drug statutes subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny. 8 9 He noted that upon remand, the Oregon Supreme
Court had determined that Oregon does not provide a religious ex-
ception to its criminal drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote. 90
Although Smith was never arrested, prosecuted, convicted, or sen-
tenced under the criminal peyote statute, the Court nevertheless be-
lieved that this case presented a ripe opportunity to evaluate the
constitutionality of Oregon's criminal statute, rather than the em-
ployment misconduct statute under which Smith was denied
may well be entitled to constitutional protection. On the other hand, if Ore-
gon does prohibit the religious use of peyote, and if that prohibition is consis-
tent with the Federal Constitution, there is no federal right to engage in that
conduct in Oregon.
Id.
187. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct., 1595, 1599, reh 'g ienied, 110 S. Ct. 2605
(1990).
188. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Ste-
vens, and Kennedy.
189. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh 'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990)
[hereinafter Smith II].
190. Id. at 1598.
benefits.191
The Smith II majority first addressed the issue of the appropriate
level of review to apply to Oregon's law criminalizing peyote.192
Prior to Smith II, most free exercise challenges had been evaluated
using the Sherbert two-part, compelling state interest test.193 How-
ever, the majority in Smith II determined that the Sherbert test
should not be applied in this case. Justice Scalia devoted his analysis
to explaining why neutrally-enacted criminal laws which have an in-
cidental impact on the free exercise of religion should not be evalu-
ated under heightened scrutiny.194
2. The free exercise clause does not excuse individuals from
complying with neutrally-enacted criminal laws.
The majority rejected Smith's argument that the free exercise
clause requires Oregon to exempt religiously motivated peyote use
from its criminal drug laws.195 In rejecting this argument, the Court
placed extensive reliance on the neutrality of Oregon's criminal drug
laws.196 Oregon's drug laws were enacted for neutral purposes: to
control the distribution, possession, and use of dangerous drugs. The
Court observed that the impact of the law on religion was merely in-
cidental.197 Smith even admitted that Oregon's criminal drug laws
were constitutional with regard to persons who used peyote for non-
religious reasons.198
To support its emphasis on the importance of religious neutrality,
the majority discussed several free exercise cases in which neutrally
enacted laws were upheld against free exercise challenges. For in-
stance, in Reynolds v. United States,199 once the Court determined
that the state's law criminalizing polygamy served a legitimate secu-
lar purpose and was not intended to have an impact on religion, the
Court's inquiry ended.20 0 The government was not required to
demonstrate that its statute was the least restrictive means of accom-
plishing a compelling state interest. Nor was it necessary to consider
the more difficult questions of legitimacy, centrality, or sincerity.
Religious neutrality, standing alone, was the determinative factor in
the Reynolds decision.20 The Smith II majority further supported
191. Id. at 1599.
192. Id. at 1602.
193. See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
194. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
195. Id. at 1599.
196. Id. at 1599-1601.
197. Id. at 1599-1600.
198. Id. at 1599.
199. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
200. Id. at 165-68.
201. Id.
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it's "religious neutrality" position by citing to Lee, Braunfeld and Gil-
lette, cases involving neutral statutes which were upheld against free
exercise challenges.2 0 2 The majority contended that religious neu-
trality was the determinative factor in all of these cases.2 03
The majority's analysis of these cases, however, can be questioned.
For instance, the Braunfeld Court did not rest its holding exclusively
on religious neutrality. That Court also weighed the state's interests
against the burden on free exercise rights. 0 4 And in Gillette and
Lee, the Government was still required to show that its laws achieved
compelling interests by the least restrictive means.20 5 Religious neu-
trality was merely one factor considered in the balancing test, help-
ing to mitigate in favor of upholding a statute.
The Smith II Court also failed to note that several cases which
have upheld free exercise claims involved neutrally enacted stat-
utes.20 6 Justice Scalia acknowledged that few of the Court's free ex-
ercise cases have involved statutes expressly targeted at religious
practices.2 o7 Since almost all of the Court's free exercise cases have
involved challenges to neutrally enacted statutes, some of which
were upheld while others were struck down, it is clear that the neu-
trality of a statute has never been an accurate predictor of whether a
202. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
205. The Gillette Court impliedly considered the compelling state interest test by
noting that "[t]he incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners' position are strictly
justified by substantial governmental interests." Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
462 (1970) (emphasis added). In Lee, the Court applied the Sherbert compelling state
interest test and held that the absence of an exception to United States tax laws was
essential to accomplish its overriding interest in the fiscal integrity of the social secur-
ity system. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-60 (1982).
206. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Court struck down
mandatory school attendance statute not intended to affect religious practices); Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Conm'n of Fl., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (striking down neutrally
enacted unemployment compensation statutes).
207. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1599. Justice Scalia stated parenthetically that "no case
of ours has involved the point." Id. To the extent that this statement is equivocal, Jus-
tice O'Connor clarified the issue in her concurrence by noting that "[o]ur free exercise
cases have all concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly
burdening a religious practice." Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) and Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961). The state constitutional provision in Torcaso required potential public employ-
ees to take an oath which required a belief in God as a condition of employment. Not
only was this a violation of both the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment, but it violated the Constitution itself. Article VI reads in part: "no reli-
gious Test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
the United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2.
statute could survive a free exercise challenge. However, Justice
Scalia's renewed and exclusive emphasis on a statute's neutrality in-
dicates that it was the determinative factor in the Smith II case.
Justice Scalia provided strong support for the majority's emphasis
on religious neutrality by analyzing other cases in which the Court
considered neutrally enacted laws which affect other individual
rights. For example, the Court has held that laws which are racially
neutral, but have a disproportionate impact on a particular racial
group, do not automatically become subject to strict scrutiny.208 Sim-
ilarly, content-neutral laws which have an incidental impact on free
speech are not necessarily subject to a compelling state interest anal-
ysis under the first amendment.209 Justice Scalia felt that applying
the strict scrutiny standard to neutrally enacted laws which inciden-
tally cause a disproportionate impact on religiously motivated con-
duct would produce a constitutional anomaly when compared to the
level of review applied to racially neutral and content-neutral laws.
Taking all of these "religious neutrality" arguments into considera-
tion, Justice Scalia determined that Oregon's peyote laws were neu-
trally enacted, because their adverse affect on Smith's religious
practices was merely incidental to the laws' secular purpose.21 0 Con-
sequently, the Smith II Court further justified its decision not to use
a compelling state interest test. This approach signifies a demotion of
the level of review applied to religiously neutral laws which nega-
tively impact religiously motivated conduct.
3. The compelling state interest test does not apply to free
exercise claims which are not supplemented by
additional constitutional protections
To further support the standard of review demotion, the majority
distinguished Smith II from a line of "hybrid" cases which applied
the compelling state interest standard to statutes which had an im-
pact on free exercise in conjunction with other first amendment or
fundamental rights.211 In distinguishing these cases, the majority ra-
tionalized that they were decided, or could have been decided, exclu-
sively on grounds other than the free exercise of religion.21 2 For
example, Justice Scalia suggested that Wisconsin v. Yoder could
have been decided solely on the basis of the parents' fundamental
rights to privacy,213 and in Wooley v. Maynard,214 the Court could
208. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
209. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16.2, at 982.
210. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
211. Id. at 1601-02.
212. Id. at 1602.
213. Id. at 1601. The Yoder Court stated that, "when the interests of parenthood
are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more
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have relied exclusively on free speech principles to strike down a law
that compelled the exhibition of a license plate slogan which con-
flicted with the challenger's religious beliefs.215
Of the seven cases cited by the majority to support its "hybrid" ex-
planation, five were decided prior to Sherbert.2'6 Since the primary
issue in Smith II was whether the Sherbert two-part, compelling state
interest test retained its constitutional vitality, cases'decided before
Sherbert provided questionable support for abolishing the Sherbert
rule. Furthermore, the Court's assertion that "[t]he only decisions in
which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a
neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections"2 17 is sim-
ply incorrect. Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie all involved neutral,
generally applicable unemployment laws and were decided exclu-
sively on free exercise grounds.2 18 These flaws diminish the major-
ity's "hybrid" explanation.
In order to assure that it did not intend for the present holding to
affect its rulings in other constitutional areas, and to reconcile its po-
sition with some of its prior free exercise cases, the Smith II Court
noted that Smith had not presented a hybrid constitutional claim. As
a result, he could not invoke the compelling state interest test more
commonly associated with other first amendment or fundamental
rights.
4. Reconciliation and Limitation. of Sherbert
Recognizing that its decision conflicted with Sherbert, the majority
devoted substantial effort to minimizing Sherbert's scope. Justice
than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's Requirements under the First
Amendment." Id. at 1601 n.1 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972)).
214. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). Interestingly, New Hampshire's brief writer in Wooley v.
Maynard was then Attorney General David H. Souter, the latest addition to the
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 706.
215. Id. The slogan in Wooley read: "Live Free or Die." The challengers were Je-
hovah's Witnesses who asserted that compulsory exhibition of the slogan offended
their moral, religious, and political beliefs. Id. at 707. The Wooley Court's analysis fo-
cused solely on the expressive aspect of the slogan without any discussion of free exer-
cise implications. Id. at 713-17.
216. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02.
217. Id. at 1601.
218. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Em-
ployment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Fl., 480 U.S. 136, 137 (1987).
Scalia first argued that, since Sherbert and its progeny were decided
in the context of state unemployment compensation laws, the Sher-
bert test has limited applicability outside the unemployment compen-
sation field.219 Next, he argued that although the Sherbert two-
prong, compelling state interest test has been applied in limited civil
contexts outside the unemployment area, it has never been applied
by the Supreme Court to a criminal law.220
The majority's analysis is flawed in several respects. First, the
Supreme Court has applied the Sherbert test to criminal laws, and it
has exempted various free exercise claimants from the reach of those
laws. For example, in In re Jenson,221 the Court vacated the crimi-
nal contempt conviction of a religious objector who refused jury ser-
vice.222 And in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Sherbert test was expressly
applied by the Supreme Court to exempt Amish parents and children
from a mandatory school attendance statute which carried a penalty
of three-months imprisonment for violations.223 And in Wooley v.
Maynard, the Court exempted the free exercise claimant from a li-
cense plate law which carried a six-month jail term.224 Furthermore,
numerous state and federal courts have applied the Sherbert test to a
variety of criminal statutes, 22 5 including peyote laws. 6 These cases
demonstrate that the free exercise clause has been applied to invali-
date criminal laws.227
The Smith II majority did not purport to overrule Sherbert.
Rather, it merely refused to extend the Sherbert test to a criminal
law,22 8 stating that "[e]ven if we were inclined to breathe into Sher-
219. Smith I, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
220. "[Wihether or not the decisions are that limited, they at least have nothing to
do with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct."
Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1603 (emphasis added).
221. 375 U.S. 14 (per curiam), vacating 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W. 2d 515 (1963).
222. On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the conviction. In re Jeni-
son, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.S.2d 588 (1963).
223. The statute in question read: "'Whoever violates this section... may be fined
not less than $5 nor more than $50 or imprisoned not more than 3 months or both.'"
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 n.2 (citing Wis. STAT. § 118.15(5) (1969)). Mr.
Yoder was actually fined only $5. Id. at 208.
224. "Another New Hampshire statute makes it a misdemeanor to 'knowingly [ob-
scure]' . .. the figures or letters on any number plate." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 707 (1977) (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975)). Mr Maynard was
fined $50 and sentenced to serve six months in jail. His sentence was suspended, but
he did serve a 15-day jail sentence. Id. at 708.
225. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.
Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (Sherbert test applied to criminal statute which prohibited
cruelty to animals).
226. See supra notes 77-110 for cases applying the Sherbert test to criminal peyote
laws.
227. See also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (Court relied on Sherbert to in-
validate a law that prohibited ministers from serving as delegates to a constitutional
convention).
228. Interestingly, refusing to apply the Sherbert test to a criminal peyote law signi-
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bert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we
would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable
criminal law."=
This criminality distinction yields two rules. First, the Sherbert
two-prong, compelling state interest test is still applicable in unem-
ployment compensation cases. Second, neutrally enacted criminal
laws are not subject to the Sherbert test. However, applying these
rules to Smith II is questionable because this is an unemployment
compensation case, not a criminal case. Smith's claim was based on
the denial of unemployment benefits under Oregon's employment
statutes. Thus, it is unclear why the Court distinguishes this case
from Sherbert on this point.
The majority also stressed that unemployment compensation pro-
grams, such as the one implicated in the Sherbert case, invite consid-
eration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's
unemployment. 230 The majority stated that "where the state has in
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend
that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling rea-
sonY23 1 Justice Scalia implied that, since criminal laws are enforcea-
ble regardless of the individual circumstances behind the criminal
conduct, the state is not required to consider an individual's religious
motivation when enforcing its criminal laws.
However, the fact that unemployment statutes invite consideration
of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment
does not fully distinguish them from criminal laws. Although crimi-
nal laws generally do not provide express exemptions for religiously
motivated conduct, 232 the criminal prosecution process is laden with
discretionary stages in which religious motivation can be considered.
For instance, the decision to prosecute is a discretionary function in
which the appropriate prosecuting authority may consider the partic-
ular circumstances behind an individual's conduct, including his reli-
fies a shift in the views of Justices Rehnquist and Stevens. In McDaniel v. Paty, Chief
Justice Burger expressly acknowledged that the California Supreme Court properly
applied the Sherbert test to a criminal peyote law in People v. Woody. Id. at 628 n.3;
see supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Jus-
tices Rehnquist and Stevens. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 620.
229. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990) (emphasis added).
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
232. One exception to this general rule is the religious exemption granted in other
states for the sacramental use of peyote. See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
gious beliefs. 233 Furthermore, the sentencing phase of a criminal
prosecution has a discretionary aspect in that a court may refuse to
impose significant penalties. In making sentencing determinations,
the court can consider any factor which mitigates the defendant's cul-
pability, including religious beliefs.2 34 These factors demonstrate
that, like unemployment compensation laws, the criminal prosecu-
tion process invites consideration of the particular circumstances be-
hind a person's conduct. Therefore, the fact that Sherbert arose in a
context that lent itself to individualized government assessment of
the reasons for the relevant conduct does not necessarily distinguish
Smith from Sherbert.
The majority staged another attack on Sherbert by referring to
Bowen v. Roy.235 In that case, an Indian claimed that according to his
religious beliefs, his daughter would be "robbed" of her religious
spirit if he were forced to furnish her social security number as a
condition of receiving government medical assistance for her. In re-
jecting the claim, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality, justi-
fied the holding primarily on the basis of the law's religious
neutrality. 236 The Smith II majority relied on Chief Justice Burger's
analysis in Bowen in holding that religious neutrality is sufficient to
avoid Sherbert's two-part test.
As a plurality decision joined by only two Justices,237 Bowen had
233. The discretionary nature of criminal prosecution is best demonstrated in the
instant case, where the state declined to criminally prosecute Smith for his admitted
use of peyote. Smith I, 110 S. Ct. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
234. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RuLES OF COURT, SENTENCING RULES FOR THE SUPERIOR
COURTS, Rule 423 (West 1990), which provides that "circumstances in mitigation in-
clude: (4) The defendant['s] ... conduct was partially excusable for some other reason
not amounting to a defense .... (7) The defendant ... mistakenly believed his conduct
was legal. (8) The defendant was motivated by a desire to provide necessities for his
family or himself." Id. Pursuant to these sections, a trial court can consider the de-
fendant's membership in the NAC as a factor which mitigates in favor of light
sentencing.
235. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
236. Id. at 701-12. Roy actually made two distinct free exercise claims. He first as-
serted that the government's internal use of a social security number designated for
his daughter robbed her daughter's religious spirit. In rejecting this claim, the Court
noted that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious
beliefs of particular citizens." Id. at 699. The Court rationalized that "Roy may no
more prevail on his religious objection to the Government's use of a Social Security
number for his daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or
color of the Government's filing cabinets." Id. at 700. His second objection concerned
the Government's requirement that he provide the number as a condition to receiving
medical assistance for his daughter. On this issue, the plurality's primary rationale for
rejecting the claim was the rule's religious neutrality. Id. at 701-12. Thus, Bowen v.
Roy provided strong support for the Smith II Court's holding.
237. Part III of Chief Justice Burger's opinion, which emphasized religious neutral-
ity, was joined only by Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Interestingly, Justice Steven's
position regarding religious neutrality in Bowen changed in the Smith II case. In
Bowen, Justice Stevens declined to join Part III of Chief Justice Burger's opinion. Id.
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no binding effect on the Smith II Court. However, Bowen is only one
of a series of free exercise cases whose combined effect provided sub-
stantial support for the majority's limitation of the Sherbert rule. In
Bowen,238 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Associa-
tion,239 Goldman v. Weinberger,mO and O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz,2-4 all decided during the four years preceding the Smith II
decision, the Court found exceptions to the Sherbert rule and refused
to apply the compelling state interest test. When viewed separately,
each of these cases establishes an isolated exception to Sherbert.
However, when viewed together, these cases indicate the Court's in-
tent to limit the applicability of Sherbert to the unemployment com-
pensation field. Thus, the synergistic effect of these cases provides
substantial support for the majority's rejection of a strict scrutiny
test for Oregon's criminal peyote laws.
Finally, the Court addressed the "centrality"2 4 2 issue, observing
that the application of the compelling state interest test should not
hinge on whether a statute affects conduct that is central to the indi-
vidual's religion.24 3 The Court held that "'it is riot within the judicial
ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretation of those
creeds.' "244 This issue was virtually the only point of law upon
which all nine justices agreed.245
B. The Concurring Opinion
1. General Information
Justice O'Connor believed that the majority's failure to apply strict
scrutiny contradicted the Court's established approach to free exer-
at 694. However, in Smith II, Justice Stevens joined the majority which solidified the
importance of religious neutrality. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597 (1990).
238. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
239. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
240. 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (traditional deference to military rules prevented an Air
Force captain from wearing a yarmulke, a head-covering worn by Orthodox Jewish
men).
241. 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (Court applied deferential "reasonable basis" review to a
prison's refusal to modify the work schedules of inmates to permit them to attend reli-
gious services).
242. See supra note 79 for a discussion of "centrality."
243. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1604.
244. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2149 (1989)).
245. Justice O'Connor and the dissenters all expressly agreed with the majority
that courts should refrain from evaluating the centrality of religious tenets. Id. at 1615
(O'Connor, J., concurring), 1621-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
cise cases. She argued that the Sherbert compelling state interest test
should have been applied to Oregon's unqualified ban on peyote.2
In applying the test, she determined that Oregon had a compelling
interest in controlling peyote, and that the state's unqualified ban
was the least restrictive means of accomplishing this interest.2 4 7
Consequently, Justice O'Connor felt that Smith's use of peyote was
not protected by the first amendment.2 "s Since Justice O'Connor
used a different level of review than the majority, but reached the
same result, she wrote separately to express her support for applying
Sherbert's two-part, compelling state interest test to laws which have
an impact upon the free exercise of religion.
As a preliminary matter, Justice O'Connor recognized that Smith
was "denied unemployment benefits because [his] sacramental use of
peyote constituted work-related 'misconduct,' not because [he] vio-
lated Oregon's general criminal prohibition against possession of pe-
yote."2 4 9 However, since the Court's holding in Smith I clearly
linked the unemployment compensation issue with the issue of
whether the state had criminalized the conduct .that led to the denial
of benefits, and since the state, on remand, held that there was no
exception to its criminal law for the religious use of peyote, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the present case was properly before the
Court.25
Justice O'Connor also highlighted the significance of the Oregon
Supreme Court's failure to address whether the state's general prohi-
bition against peyote violated the Oregon Constitution.251 As dis-
cussed above, rather than evaluating its peyote laws under its state
constitution as requested to do on remand, the Oregon high court
only considered their federal constitutionality.52 Justice O'Connor
noted that the Oregon Supreme Court can reopen the question
presented in this case by evaluating whether the Oregon Constitution
requires the state to create an exception to its criminal drug laws for
the sacramental use of peyote.253
2. The Standard of Review
To support her contention that the compelling state interest test
was an appropriate level of review, Justice O'Connor focused on the
plain language of the free exercise clause which provides, "Congress
246. Id. at 1612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 1614-15.
248. Id. at 1615.
249. Id. at 1607.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
253. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."254
Since Oregon's peyote law prohibits the use of peyote, and since the
free exercise of Smith's religion requires the use of peyote, Oregon's
law prohibits the free exercise of religion on their face.2rw Justice
O'Connor observed that Oregon's peyote law implicates the free ex-
ercise of religion regardless of whether it also affects nonreligious
conduct.2 56 It is of no consequence to a Native American Church
member that the law also bans the recreational use of peyote. The
first amendment, she argued, makes no distinction between relig-
iously neutral laws and those which expressly target particular reli-
gious practices.2 5 7
Justice O'Connor noted that, although the free exercise clause pro-
vides absolute protection for religious beliefs, the freedom to act in
accordance with one's religious beliefs often conflicts with important
governmental concerns.2 58 In order to reconcile this conflict, and in
recognition of the Constitution's mandate for religious liberty, the
Court has applied strict scrutiny to laws which have an impact on
free exercise conduct. Under the strict scrutiny text, the state must
demonstrate that its laws are the least restrictive means of accom-
plishing a compelling governmental interest.259
Justice O'Connor argued that refusing to apply the two-part, com-
pelling state interest test conflicted with prior free exercise cases, es-
pecially Wisconsin v. Yoder.2O She noted that in Yoder, the Court
held that even regulations of general applicability are still subject to
the free exercise clause.26 ' Moreover, Yoder addressed the precise is-
sue that was before the Smith II Court, and held that religiously neu-
tral criminal laws are subject to the free exercise clause.262
In order to support its decision not to apply the Sherbert rule to
Smith's free exercise claim, the majority stressed that Smith's con-
duct violated a criminal law, where as Sherbert's did not. Justice
O'Connor objected to this distinction. In her view, "a neutral crimi-
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1608.
256. Id. ("A person is barred from freely exercising his religion regardless of
whether the law prohibits conduct only when engaged in for religious reasons, only by
members of that religion, or by all persons.").
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1608-09.
260. Id. at 1609.
261. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).
262. Id.
nal law prohibiting conduct that a State may legitimately regulate is,
if anything, more burdensome than a neutral civil statute placing le-
gitimate conditions on the award of a state benefit."26 3
Justice O'Connor also objected to the majority's characterization of
Yoder as a "hybrid" that was decided primarily on grounds other
than the free exercise clause.2 4 She countered that Yoder was ex-
pressly decided on free exercise grounds2 65 and that its compelling
state interest analysis is "part of the mainstream of our free exercise
jurisprudence."26 6 She further noted that in the other decisions cited
by the majority, the free exercise claims were rejected only after the
Court had carefully weighed the competing interests. In Justice
O'Connor's view, the mere fact that many free exercise claims have
failed is no reason to question whether the compelling state interest
test retains its constitutional vitality in the free exercise arena.
To support her position, she noted that the Court has not declined
to apply the Sherbert two-part, compelling state interest test to re-
cent free exercise claims.267 Justice O'Connor noted that while the
Court has rejected many free exercise claims, it has never rejected
the applicability of the Sherbert two-part, compelling state interest
test in making its determination.26 s Justice O'Connor observed that
the only free exercise cases in which the compelling state interest
test was not applied involved specialized contexts involving military
or prison environments, in which the government has traditionally
never been required to demonstrate a compelling interest.6 9
Justice O'Connor did not address the fact that the Court has re-
peatedly considered religious neutrality as one factor to consider in
upholding a statute. Although the majority in Smith II extrapolated
the significance of religious neutrality by deeming it to be a determi-
native element, it cannot be denied that several Court opinions have
discussed its importance. 270 The Justice could have strengthened her
position by recognizing that religious neutrality has been considered
by the Court, and by explaining that it is merely one consideration
which mitigates in favor of finding that a law does not violate the
free exercise clause.271
263. Id. at 1611.
264. Id. at 1602.
265. Id. at 1609 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-229)..
266. Id. at 1609-10.
267. Id. at 1611.
268. Id. at 1610.
269. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (free exercise claim re-
jected in light of Court's traditional deference to Congress concerning military regula-
tions); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (compelling state interest test
inapplicable to prison regulations).
270. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397
U.S. 664, 676 (1969).
271. Both the majority and Justice O'Connor acknowledged that almost every free
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Justice O'Connor objected to the majority's failure to provide any
convincing justification for abandoning the compelling state interest
test in free exercise cases. 272 However, the majority did not explic-
itly say that its holding departed from free exercise jurisprudence.
Instead, it strained to rationalize its holding as being in accordance
with prior free exercise cases. As a result, the majority's arguments
were not phrased as justifications for abandoning the compelling
state interest test. To the extent that Justice O'Connor could extract
justifications, she sharply disagreed with them.
The Justice first rejected any implication by the majority that the
mere neutrality of a law is sufficient to warrant abandoning strict
scrutiny. In her view, "laws neutral toward religion can coerce a per-
son to violate his religious conscience ... just as effectively as laws
aimed at religion."27 3 Second, in response to the majority's conten-
tion that applying the compelling state interest test to the free exer-
cise clause is inconsistent with the Court's deferential approach
towards racially neutral or speech-neutral laws,274 Justice O'Connor
argued that strict scrutiny should be applied because the free exer-
cise of religion is a preferred constitutional activity that is explicitly
safeguarded in the first clause of the first amendment.2 7s Third, she
simply disagreed with the majority's concern that lower court judges
will have to regularly balance statutes against the importance of reli-
gious practice.276 She felt that courts would be able to strike sensible
balances between religious freedom and competing governmental
concerns.
277
Additionally, Justice O'Connor distinguished the cases referred to
by the majority in support of its position which did not apply the
Sherbert test.278 Justice O'Connor argued that, unlike the present
case, in both Bowen v. Roy and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
exercise case which the Court has addressed has concerned a religiously neutral law.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text. Since some religiously neutral laws which
have an impact on religion have been upheld while others have been struck down, it is
clear that the religious neutrality of a law has had no correlative impact on whether it
violated the free exercise clause. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
272. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1614, n.3.
275. Id. at 1609. However, Justice O'Connor's rebuttal did not address different
treatment accorded to racially neutral and speech neutral laws.
276. Id. at 1606 n.5.
277. Id. at 1613.
278. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 n.2 '(1990) (explaining Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1985)).
Protective Association, the Sherbert test was not applicable because
the cases involved free exercise claimants who were attempting to
dictate how the government should conduct its internal affairs. Jus-
tice O'Connor noted that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot
be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal
affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens." 279 The majority attempted to place Smith II within the
scope of those cases by characterizing Oregon's criminal drug prohibi-
tion as an internal health and safety program. 28 0 However, the anal-
ogy implied by the majority is attenuated. Bowen and Lyng involved
the government's behavior with respect to its office procedures2s ' and
land use,28 2 respectively. In contrast, Oregon's criminal drug laws
were intended to affect individual behavior by forbidding the use of
peyote. In Justice O'Connor's view, any law which affects an individ-
ual's religious freedom should be subject to the Sherbert compelling
state interest test.283
The majority was also concerned that if the Sherbert test were ap-
plied to criminal prohibition, then courts would be faced with a flood
of free exercise challenges to civic obligations of almost every con-
ceivable kind.284 To illustrate this point, Justice Scalia set forth a
"parade of horribles" in which laws relating to such areas as child ne-
glect, animal cruelty and environmental protection were challenged
on religious grounds.28 5 Since the laws at issue in these cases were
all upheld, however, Justice O'Connor contended that courts are
quite capable of striking "sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing state interests."2 88
The Justice concluded her support for applying the compelling
state interest test by criticizing the Court's apathy towards less estab-
lished religions.28 7 The majority acknowledged that minority reli-
gious groups are often unable to pressure legislators to accommodate
their religious practices.28 8 But the majority was willing to accept
any disparity in the law as simply an "unavoidable consequence" of a
279. Id. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699).
280. Id.
281. See supra note 235-37 and accompanying text.
282. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450. It was not disputed that the government's use of its land
"could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices." Id. at 451.
283. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
284. Id. at 1605-06.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1613.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1606. However, the NAC is not a group that is unable to protect its in-
terests through the legislative process, as evidenced by the fact that 23 states and the
federal government provide an exception from criminal drug laws for the sacramental
use of peyote. See supra note 186.
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pluralistic society.28 9 Justice O'Connor disagreed, reasoning that the
free exercise clause was specifically intended to protect minority reli-
gions from an intolerant majority.2 90 To support her position, she
noted that the very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to prevent cer-
tain freedoms from being subject to political influences.29 ' Thus, she
concluded, in order to accommodate the widest possible toleration of
religion, the first amendment requires the government to demon-
strate that any law which has an impact on the free exercise of reli-
gion must be subject to the highest level of judicial scrutiny under
the compelling state interest test.29 2
3. Compelling State Interest Analysis
After concluding that Smith's free exercise claim should be ana-
lyzed under Sherbert's two-part, compelling state interest test, Jus-
tice O'Connor proceeded to apply the test. She argued that the first
prong of the test was clearly satisfied because a criminal prohibition
of peyote use imposed a substantial burden on Smith's religious
practices.293
The Justice next considered the second prong of the test, which re-
quires the state to demonstrate a compelling interest which cannot be
accomplished by less restrictive means.2 9 4 Justice O'Connor ob-
served that the Court has held drug abuse to be "'one of the greatest
problems affecting the health and welfare of our population' and
thus 'one of the most serious problems confronting society today.' "295
For this reason, she concluded that Oregon does have a compelling
interest in proscribing the use of peyote.29 For Justice O'Connor,
the critical question was whether exempting Smith from the statute
would interfere with the state's interest in preventing harm caused
by drug use. Conceding that the question was close, she nevertheless
concluded that the uniform application of the law was essential to
the state's goals because (1) the damage to health caused by drug use
289. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
290. Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). "Only those interests of the high-
est order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
295. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1614 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Treasury Em-
ployees v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1989).
296. Id.
occurs regardless of the user's religious motivation, and (2) the socie-
tal need to prevent trafficking of controlled substances could be ad-
versely affected by exemptions.2 9 7
However, Justice O'Connor did not squarely address the dissent's
questions regarding whether Oregon's interest in prohibiting the reli-
gious use of peyote was truly "compelling." The dissent noted that
peyote is not a popular recreational drug and comprises only a minus-
cule percentage of drug trafficking.298 Justice O'Connor painted a
broad stroke and was unwilling to consider the varying impacts of
different drugs.299 The dissent also questioned how Oregon could as-
sert that its interest in proscribing peyote use is compelling when it
had not even bothered to criminally prosecute Smith for the
crime.3oo Justice O'Connor simply neglected to address this question.
The dissent also pointed out that twenty-three states and the federal
government currently exempt sacramental peyote use from criminal
prosecution. 301 Justice O'Connor merely responded that other states
are free to provide the exception without Oregon being required to
do so by the first amendment.30 2 She referred to Congress' Schedule
I list of controlled substances, which includes peyote, to demonstrate
peyote's threat to health and safety,303 but minimized the significance
of Congress' declaration that Schedule I does not apply to sacramen-
tal peyote use.3 04 Justice O'Connor's failure to confront these argu-
ments places her analysis into question.
Justice O'Connor concluded, without significant analysis, that ex-
empting the sacramental use of peyote from criminal drug laws
would significantly interfere with Oregon's drug enforcement opera-
tions.30 5 In her view, uniform application of Oregon's prohibition
against peyote is essential to accomplish its compelling interest in
preventing drug abuse and trafficking. As a result, Oregon's uncondi-
tional prohibition against peyote was the least restrictive means of
accomplishing its goals.3 06 Having found that Oregon's drug laws are
narrowly tailored to accomplish its compelling interest in controlling
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 1614-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
300. Id. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 1618 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 1615 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
303. Id. at 1614.
304. Id. at 1615 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1989)). The Federal Code provides, "The
listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the non-drug
use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and
members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from registra-
tion." 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31; see also Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 1458, 1463-64
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining rationale for sacramental exception).
305. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1614 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 1614-15.
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drug abuse, Justice O'Connor concluded that Oregon's peyote laws
could withstand strict scrutiny and, therefore, passed the compelling
state interest test.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
agreed with Justice O'Connor that Sherbert's two-part, compelling
state interest test should have been applied in this case. Justice
Blackmun felt that the majority's opinion "mischaracterized this
Court's precedents"3 07 and "effectuated a wholesale overturning of
settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution."30 8
Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun thought that it was beyond
question that strict scrutiny should be applied to laws which have an
impact upon the free exercise of religion.3 o9 However, the dissenters
thought that Oregon's criminal drug laws failed the compelling state
interest test because they did not provide an exception for the sacra-
mental use of peyote.310 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the state
does not have a compelling interest in proscribing the religious use of
peyote, and even if it did, its laws were not narrowly drafted to ac-
complish that goal.
Before beginning his analysis, Justice Blackmun expressed his
trepidation about the procedural problems in the case. When the Or-
egon Supreme Court first heard the case, that court held that the il-
legal nature of peyote use was irrelevant to the determination of
whether Smith's religious use of peyote justified the denial of unem-
ployment benefits. The Court in Smith I expressly disagreed. Jus-
tice Blackmun, who joined the dissent in Smith I, continued to assert
that the Oregon Supreme Court could still reverse the result of this
case by simply concluding that the illegality of peyote is irrelevant to
Oregon's unemployment benefit programs.3 1l Additionally, Justice
Blackmun acknowledged that the Oregon Supreme Court has yet to
judge its criminal peyote laws under the Oregon Constitution. 12
Consequently, he felt that since the Oregon Supreme Court was still
at liberty to reverse the result of this case by simply declaring that
the state constitution requires a religious exception, the present case
307. Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1617.
311. Id. at 1616 n.2.
312. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
was not a proper exercise of judicial restraint over matters of state
law.3 13 Despite these procedural misgivings, Justice Blackmun reluc-
tantly concluded that the constitutionality of Oregon's failure to pro-
vide a religious exception to its criminal drug laws was properly
presented to the Court.3 14
Justice Blackmun did not agree with Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion that Oregon's drug laws could pass the compelling state
interest test.3 15 The real issue of the case was not the state's broad
interest in fighting the "war on drugs," he contended.316 Tracking
the Court's treatment of the compelling state interest test in free ex-
ercise cases, he observed that the Court has never blindly accepted a
state's "sweeping claim" of interest. Rather, the Court has demanded
that the asserted state interest be properly narrowed to reflect the
precise interest involved.317 Justice Blackmun contended that in
Smith I the state's actual interest was the narrow one of refusing to
make an exception for the religious use of peyote.3 18
Justice Blackmun proceeded to compare the use of peyote to other
drugs to demonstrate why providing a religious exception posed no
significant threat to drug enforcement activities. First, peyote's bitter
taste and propensity to induce nausea make it unpopular as a recrea-
tional drug.319 Furthermore, there is almost no illegal traffic in pe-
yote in the United States.3o Additionally, the NAC regards the non-
religious use of peyote by its member as a sacrilege and imposes in-
ternal restrictions on its use.3 21 According to Justice Blackmun, pe-
yote has also been proven to be a positive force in improving the
mental, physical, and spiritual lives of NAC members by promoting
familial responsibility, self-reliance, and abstinence from alcohol.322
Another factor mitigating against Oregon was the fact that twenty-
three states323 and the federal government 324 provide an exemption
from criminal drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote. In Justice
Blackmun's view, this supports the notion that providing the excep-
tion is not incompatible with the states' broad and concededly com-
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1617.
316. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
317. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1619 n.7.
320. Id. at 1620 (citing a Drug Enforcement Agency finding that between 1980 and
1987, only 19.4 pounds of illegally transported peyote was seized, compared to 15 mil-
lion pounds of illegally transported marijuana seized).
321. Id. at 1618-19.
322. Id. at 1619-20.
323. Id. at 1618 n.5 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citing Smith-Oregon II, 307 Or. 68, 73
n.2, 763 P.2d 146, 148 n.2 (1988)).
324. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1989)).
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pelling interest in winning the violent war against more dangerous
drugs.325
Justice Blackmun also questioned the degree of Oregon's interest
in proscribing the use of peyote when it had neglected to prosecute a
criminal case against Smith's admitted use of the drug.32 6 Further-
more, Oregon failed to demonstrate that it had made any significant
efforts to enforce its prohibition against peyote.327 In addition, Ore-
gon has only one reported case on the issue, and the state failed to
offer evidence regarding the extent of peyote use in Oregon. Justice
Blackmun perceived the lack of legal activity concerning peyote in
Oregon as strong evidence that the state's actual interest is merely
the "symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition."32 8 Since
Oregon has minimal interest in enforcing the law, Justice Blackmun
reasoned that it could not possibly have a compelling interest in de-
nying a religious exception to an isolated sect of society.
Oregon had argued that granting an exception would invite a flood
of bad-faith claims for religious exemptions which would hinder law
enforcement efforts.3 9 Justice Blackmun rejected this argument as
speculative, observing that the states which provide the exception
have not been confronted with a flood of spurious claims.330 Addi-
tionally, he noted that courts have proven quite capable of ferreting
out insincere religious claims. In support of this contention, Justice
Blackmun set forth a line of state and federal cases in which criminal
convictions for use of marijuana, hashish, and heroine were upheld
against free exercise challenges.331
The State had also argued that granting an exception only to NAC
members violates the establishment clause.332 Justice Blackmun re-
sponded by noting that the test of whether a state has violated the
establishment clause is not by reaching uniform results as to all
325. Id. at 1618.
326. Id. at 1617.
327. Id. While the state's failure to enforce a law against some individuals does not
in itself preclude the state from enforcing it against other persons, it should be noted
that selective enforcement is a trademark of religious intolerance which the free exer-
cise clause, as well as the equal protection clause, were designed to prevent.
328. Id. An unenforced statute is not ripe for review. For example, in Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), rehg denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961), the Court refused to reach
the merits of a statute that was never enforced. See generally TREATISE, supra note 18,
§ 2.13(d), at 115-19.
329. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1620-21 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 1621.
claims, but by the uniform application of the "compelling state inter-
est test to all free exercise claims."3 33 He concluded that religious
peyote use by the NAC, unlike many other religious groups or sects,
would not interfere with the state's interest.334
Justice Blackmun concurred with both Justice O'Connor and the
majority on the issue of centrality.33 5 All nine Justices agreed that
courts are not competent to evaluate which tenets are central to the
practice of a particular religion because such a query would force the
Court into the position of "rubber stamping" religions and would in-
evitably lead to implications of intolerance for minority religions.3 36
Because these are the dangers which the drafters of the first amend-
ment sought to prevent, any inquiry into centrality is contrary to one
or both of the religion clauses. Thus, the Court sent a unanimous sig-
nal that such inquiries are inappropriate in free exercise
jurisprudence.
VI. IMPACT
A. The Level of Review
The majority in Smith II devoted much of its opinion to explaining
why Sherbert's compelling state interest test was not applicable to
Smith's free exercise claim; However, the majority did not identify
or apply an alternate level of review. Without employing any consti-
tutional test or providing any analysis, the Court simply concluded
that Oregon's prohibition against peyote use is constitutional, and the
denial of unemployment compensation benefits was not inconsistent
with the free exercise clause.33 7
The Court's failure to identify or apply any constitutional test is
disturbing in two respects. First, the Court assumed that the law was
constitutional simply because it was not subject to the compelling
state interest test. Second, and more importantly for constitutional
considerations, future courts faced with free exercise claims have no
express guidance regarding which level of review to apply to relig-
iously neutral laws. Should courts apply mere minimal scrutiny
whereby any legitimate governmental objective will be sufficient to
defeat a free exercise claim? Or should courts apply an intermediate
level balancing test whereby free exercise rights prevail unless the
law is substantially related to the achievement of important govern-
mental objectives?
Although the Smith II majority left this question unanswered, fu-
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1621.
337. Id. at 1606.
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ture courts must nevertheless determine which level of review to ap-
ply to religiously neutral laws. The majority in Smith II expressly
refused to apply strict scrutiny; and if they intended to apply inter-
mediate scrutiny, surely they would have provided some middle level
analysis. By process of elimination, courts will assume that minimal
scrutiny should be applied to religiously neutral laws. This assump-
tion is consistent with prior free exercise cases in which the Court
applied minimal scrutiny after rejecting the applicability of the Sher-
bert test. For example, in Bowen v. Roy 33S and Goldman v.
Weinburger,39 the Court applied minimal scrutiny after characteriz-
ing the cases as exceptions to the Sherbert rule. By analogy, future
courts will assume that the Court's rejection of the Sherbert test in
the Smith II case implies that minimal scrutiny was applied to' Ore-
gon's peyote laws, and that future free exercise challenges to relig-
iously neutral laws should similarly be evaluated under the rational
basis test.
B Effect on Future Free Exercise Jurisprudence
Smith II will have no effect on legislation which is intended to
have an impact on the free exercise of religion. If a statute declares
its intent to regulate religious acts, or is expressly targeted at reli-
gious conduct as such, or uses religious motivation to describe prohib-
ited conduct, then the statute will still be reviewed by the compelling
state interest test. However, most free exercise cases have involved
neutral laws which were not expressly targeted at religious conduct.
Thus, the true impact of the Smith II decision must be evaluated by
examining its effect on cases which involve religiously neutral laws.
The majority emphasized that the Sherbert test should still be ap-
plied to civil unemployment compensation statutes. Thus, the prece-
dental value of the three unemployment compensation cases,
Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie, is undisturbed by the Smith II deci-
sion. Future free exercise claimants who are discharged from their
employment- for engaging in religiously motivated conduct will still
be entitled to have their free exercise claims evaluated under the
compelling state interest test, provided that their conduct does not vi-
olate a criminal statute.
Outside of the unemployment compensation area, religiously neu-
tral laws will no longer be evaluated under Sherbert's compelling
338. 476 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1986).
339. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
state interest test.34o According to the majority in Smith II, "the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).' "341 Because much of free exer-
cise jurisprudence has concerned religiously neutral laws, the scope
of the free exercise clause is severely limited by the Smith I deci-
sion. After Smith II, if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the
object of a law, but merely the incidental effect of a generally appli-
cable and otherwise valid provision, the first amendment is not
violated.
Prior to Smith II, courts evaluated laws which had an impact on
the free exercise of religion under the compelling state interest test,
regardless of whether they were neutral with regard to religious con-
duct. For example, in Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court noted that
"[e]ach value judgment under the Religion Clauses must therefore
turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish
or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of
doing so."342 And in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court ruled that "[a]
regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless of-
fend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it
unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." 34 3 The approach taken
by the Smith II majority is diametrically opposed to the rules set
forth in Walz and Yoder. Thus, Justice Blackmun was correct when
he declared that the majority's holding was a "wholesale overturning
of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our
Constitution."34 4
In ruling that the Sherbert rule was inapplicable to Smith's free ex-
ercise claim, the majority emphasized that Smith's conduct violated a
criminal statute, thereby limiting the applicability of its holding to
criminal laws. Justice Scalia noted, "[w]hether or not the [post-Sher-
bert] decisions are that limited, they at least have nothing to do with
an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of con-
duct." 34 5 This language establishes the minimum holding in Smith
II: neutrally enacted criminal laws are not subject to the Sherbert
test. At the same time, it suggests that the Smith II decision might
be applicable only to criminal laws, and not to civil laws. Moreover,
340. In order to limit Sherbert, the majority suggested that it would be reluctant to
apply Sherbert outside of the unemployment compensation field. Smith II, 110 S. Ct.
at 1602.
341. Id. at 1600 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
342. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1969) (emphasis added).
343. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
344. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 1603 (emphasis added).
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any language in the Smith II decision which extends its holding to
non-criminal laws is dicta because Smith II presumably involved a
criminal law. An extension of the Smith II decision may someday ex-
pand the ruling to all civil laws, but until the Court expressly de-
clares that all neutrally enacted laws should be evaluated under
minimal scrutiny, Smith II should probably be interpreted narrowly
and applied only to criminal laws.
In recent years, the Court has created numerous exception to Sher-
bert which had begun to erode the Sherbert rule. Smith II continues
that erosion by holding Sherbert inapplicable to neutrally enacted
criminal laws. Prior to Smith II, states were required to demonstrate
that laws which imposed any burden on religious conduct achieved a
compelling state interest through means that were the least restric-
tive of religious liberty. This rule applied regardless of whether the
burden was intended or incidental, or whether the law was civil or
criminal. However, after Smith II, a criminal statute that has a legit-
imate secular goal, and whose impact on religion is merely incidental,
is not subject to a compelling state interest test in a free exercise
challenge. Laws which mandate or prohibit conduct under the threat
of criminal sanctions will be subject only to minimal scrutiny,
whereas laws which merely discourage or encourage conduct by the
denial or grant of governmental benefits, without the threat of crimi-
nal penalties, will be evaluated under strict scrutiny. The irony of
this approach is that laws which impose the greatest burden on reli-
gious conduct will now undergo the least judicial scrutiny, whereas
laws which impose the least burden on religious conduct will now un-
dergo the greatest judicial scrutiny.
States may still exempt religiously motivated conduct from the
reach of their criminal laws. However, "to say that a nondiscrimina-
tory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desir-
able, is not to say that it is constitutionally required . . . ."346 State
courts may hold that their state constitutions require that the com-
pelling state interest test be applied to laws which inhibit religious
conduct. Additionally, courts may still create judicial exceptions
which prevent criminal statutes from reaching religiously motivated
conduct. However, without a compelling state interest test mandated
by the Supreme Court, the pressure on lower courts to create these
exceptions is limited. Because the rational basis test requires courts
to give deference to legislative policy, these courts will no longer pro-
346. Id. at 1606.
vide an effective avenue of relief for persons whose religiously moti-
vated conduct is proscribed by criminal laws. Instead, religious
groups must look primarily to legislators for tolerance of their reli-
gious conduct. However, as the majority in Smith II noted, "leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disad-
vantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in
"347
C. Judicial Restraint
In Smith I, Justice Brennan declared that
each Term this Court discovers only after painstaking briefing and oral argu-
ment that some cases do not squarely present the issues that the Court sought
to resolve. There is always the temptation to trivialize the defect and decide
the novel case that we thought we had undertaken .... Here, however, the
Court's belated effort to recoup sunk costs is not worth the price. Today's
foray into the realm of the hypothetical will surely cost us the respect of the
State Supreme Court whose words we misconstrue.3 4 8
And in Smith II, Justice Blackmun remarked that he had "grave
doubts... as to the wisdom or propriety of deciding the constitution-
ality of a criminal prohibition which the State has not sought to en-
force ."349 He further remarked that "[i]t is surprising, to say the
least, that this Court which so often prides itself about principles of
judicial restraint . . . would stretch its jurisdiction to the limit in or-
der to reach, in this abstract setting, the constitutionality of Oregon's
criminal prohibition of peyote use."' 0
Despite these trepidations, the dissenters reluctantly agreed that
the constitutional issue was properly presented in Smith II.351 Both
the majority352 and Justice O'Connor3 53 similarly agreed. However,
all nine Justices merely referred to Smith I to support their finding
of ripeness without addressing the fact that Smith was never arrested
or even threatened with criminal prosecution for his use of peyote.3 5 4
Without any significant factual discussion of the question of ripeness,
the case was evaluated in an "abstract setting," the Court's actions re-
flecting a cavalier attitude toward the doctrine of judicial restraint.
347. Id.
348. Smith I, 485 U.S. 660, 679 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). '
349. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1616 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
350. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
351. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 1599.
353. Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
354. The majority referred to Smith I to support its implicit finding of justicibility.
Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1598-99. Justice O'Connor referred to Smith I to support the
broad rule that a state's power to deny unemployment benefits based on misconduct
depends on whether the state has criminalized the underlying conduct. Smith II, 110
S. Ct. at 1606-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The dissent also based its finding of jus-
ticibility exclusively on Smith I. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1616 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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D. Effect on the Native American Church
Since the majority of states with significant Indian populations pro-
vide an exception from their criminal drug laws for the sacramental
use of peyote, the Smith II decision will not have a significant impact
on NAC members outside of Oregon. Since Oregon has reaffirmed
its hostility towards Peyotism, "NAC members will probably migrate
to more tolerant states. This reaction would'not be surprising be-
cause the intolerance of religion has historically led to migration by
the oppressed minority. While colonial Puritans of Massachusetts
had to endure a life threatening, five-month voyage across the Atlan-
tic Ocean to escape religious persecution, NAC members in Oregon
can safely trek to states such as Arizona to find political systems
more tolerant of Peyotism. 355 Furthermore, since the NAC probably
lacks significant political influence in Oregon, its members stand lit-
tle chance of convincing the legislature to provide an exception to the
state's criminal drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote. The
political obstacles which the NAC will likely encounter in Oregon,
together with the relative ease of relocating in other states, indicate
that migration from Oregon to more tolerant states will be the short-
term solution for devout NAC members. If the Smith II decision is
limited to criminal laws, then free exercise claimants in states which
provide the exception will be virtually unaffected because their use
of peyote is not criminally punishable. However, until the Court ac-
knowledges that the illegality of peyote was irrelevant in determin-
ing whether the use of peyote by a drug rehabilitation counselor
constitutes misconduct for which he can be fired, then Peyotists who
work at drug rehabilitation centers will not be eligible for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Employment Division's persistent refusal to provide an excep-
tion to its criminal drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote typi-
fies the 19th-century attitudes which have led, to the relocation and
355. Arizona is probably the safest haven for Peyotists. The Arizona judiciary was
one of the first to grant an exception for the sacramental use of peyote. Arizona v.
Attakai, Criminal No. 4098, Coconino County, July 26, 1960 (cited in People v. Woody,
61 Cal. 2d 716, 724 n.5, 394 P.2d 813, 819 n.5, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 n.5 (1964)); see also
State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1973)
(ruling that the Sherbert test requires a sacramental peyote use exception). Addition-
ally, the Arizona legislature has statutorily exempted the sacramental use of peyote
from its criminal drug laws. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402 (Supp. 1986).
oppression of Native American Indians. In a country as diverse as
the United States, with ethnic groups from every corner of the globe
and hundreds of religions,35 it is sad to see such intolerance from an
administrative agency. No one questions that the war on drugs is a
serious national crisis. However, if the Congress of the United States
and twenty-three other states have determined that providing an ex-
ception for the sacramental use of peyote conflicts with drug enforce-
ment activities, how can the Oregon Employment Division maintain
such a hostile posture towards Peyotism?
In any event, Smith's unemployment compensation claim should
have been evaluated independently of the fact that his conduct was
illegal. The only relevant consideration should have been whether
his use of peyote constituted misconduct as defined by his employer.
Because of his unique position as a drug rehabilitation counselor,
Smith's use of peyote impaired his credibility and detracted from his
ability to function as a legitimate role model. Thus, his actions con-
flicted with his employer's interests, and the employer had the right
to discharge him for misconduct. By this view, the Employment Di-
vision could have denied his unemployment compensation claim
based solely upon the misconduct statute.
Prior to Smith II, courts had effectively applied the Sherbert com-
pelling state interest test to both civil and criminal laws, reaching
reasonable results. However, the majority in Smith II decided that
the Sherbert test should no longer apply to criminal laws. After
Smith II, laws which create the greatest burden on religious conduct
by imposing criminal sanctions will now undergo the least judicial
scrutiny. As a result, religious freedom will be at the mercy of
elected legislators. But as Justice Jackson once remarked:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of ma-
jorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
35 7
. DAvID LEVENTHAL
356. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (citing YEAR BOOK OF AMERICAN
CHURCHES FOR 1958 257).
357. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
